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PREFACE
We have largely lost sight of academic freedom for the student and it
is high time that it be restored to our academic pattern and recognized as
having constitutional underpinnings in many of its facets. The reason for
urging this restoration is practical, not sentimental. Almost all the pres-
sures on the youth in our society are for conservatism and conformity. The
pressures of the home, community, television and other media, and from
most of the paraphernalia of life that surrounds today's youth all create a
climate of opinion which makes for conformity and conservatism.
One of the functions of the university is to provide some counterbal-
ance to this tradition of conservatism and habit of conformity so natural to
youth. Probably nowhere else in the world do young persons talk so much
about their liberty and do so little with it when they have it as here in the
United States. They do not know how to act when they are given inde-
pendence because they have not been trained to use it. Our colleges and
universities are especially remiss at providing effective training in the na-
ture, observance, or use of freedom.t One may well ask when our young
people are supposed to learn how to be independent, how to think for
themselves, how to assume the duties and obligations of citizenship, and
how to manage their own affairs if they do not learn it in this crucial period
of their lives. How will today's youth grow up intellectually if they are
not allowed to do so in their college years?
The reason for all this is as elementary as it is obvious. The reason
for freedom for the student, for freedom from incursions on first amend-
ment rights and guarantees, is the same reason as that for freedom for the
scientist or for the judge; namely, that it is the price of survival. It is a
price we pay for avoiding error and seeking truth; it is the price we pay
for pushing outward the boundaries of knowledge and for training a new
generation in independence of thought and character. On no other terms
can we get first-rate citizens; and on no other terms can we have any expec-
tation of avoiding error and discovering truth, which is a function of all
kinds of freedom: of speech, of the press, and of association.
I. BACKGROUND OF UNIVERSITY/STUDENT IRELATIONSHIP
There looms large on the horizon of most state universities a necessary
reexamination of the important question which, posed in general terms,
M ember of Florida Bar; J. D. University of Florida; LLM University of Illinois; As-
sistant Professor of Social Sciences, University of Florida.
t Throughout this article the terms "college," "university," and "institution" are used in-
terchangeably to denote an institution of higher education.
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can be stated thusly: Are the constitutional principles of the first and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States applicable to
the relationships between a university and its students? Until recently, the
courts have held, with few exceptions, that although there exists the requi-
site jurisdiction to hear student cases, the area is one to be entered by the
courts only with the greatest restraint and caution.
The judicial reliance on a self-perpetuating stare decisis approach to
the problem of judicially reviewing a university's actions in student dis-
ciplinary matters has negated any significant attempt to examine the prob-
lem comprehensively. It is only of relatively recent date that courts have
recognized the viability and impact of judicial review in student claims of
constitutional infringement relating to university expulsion, suspension, or
other disciplinary action.1 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has only re-
cently spoken directly to issues raised in the attempt t6 apply constitutional
principles to a student's status within the educational and institutional
framework?
This paper will attempt to treat the exercise by students of first amend-
ment free speech rights and the limit of authority exercised by school ad-
ministrations vis-a-vis that exercise. The primary issue to consider in this
regard is: In adopting appropriate measures to maintain decorum among
students and engender the academic atmosphere, what are the limits beyond
which institutional authorities cannot go in deterring actions which would
dearly be protected by the first amendment against interference by other
state or state action machinery? Stated differently, when does the establish-
ment of academic freedom limitations become a matter involving first
amendment infringement?
The Privilege/Right Rationale
An often used justification and defense to support summary action
taken by a university as a proper exercise of power has been the theory that
attendance is a mere privilege and not a right.3 When an institution al-
leges that, by his attendance, a student has effectively waived his right to
be free from the imposition of sanctions without procedural due process,
it is doing no less than saying that a pre-condition for the exercise of the
privilege of attending school is the submission to an unconstitutional con-
dition.4 The logic in such an approach is immediately persuasive. Indeed,
1Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), reversing
186 F. Supp. 945 (M.D. Ala. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); accord, Knight v. State
Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 Of course a student who is scholastically ineligible for admission into a given university
does not have a constitutional right to attend that institution. Wright v. Texas Southern
University, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968).
4 Goldberg v. Regents of University of California, 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
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this reasoning served for a long time as the determinative tool of legal
analysis in cases concerning governmental/individual relationships in
which the individual received something of value. It was long assumed
that if the grant of a benefit to a party rested within the discretion of the
state then, ipso facto, the granting authority could attach a burden or con-
dition to the grant. "... . [T]he greater power contains the lesser."5 For
example, if public employment is only a privilege extended by the govern-
mental authority, a municipal employee should not be heard in alleging
impairment of constitutional freedoms through an ordinance prohibiting
solicitation of political contributions. The employee "... may have a con-
stitutional right to [engage in) politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be [an employee)." 0 Placed in the context of this paper, one may para-
phrase the above by saying that one has a constitutionally underscored right
to be a conscientious objector, but not a correlative right to refuse to engage
in military training as a required course of a university.7
The philosophy which is the credo of the right/privilege theory was
best given articulation in the early case of Anthony v. Syracuse,' in which
a New York court said: "Attendance at the university is a privilege and not
a right.., the university reserves the right and the student concedes to the
university the right to require the withdrawal of any student at any time
for any reason ... and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need be
given."9
The Contract Rationale
Allied to the privilege/right theory, there remains another principle of
administrative power allegedly justified by the idea of waiver. One author
erroneously proposes that the so-called "contract theory" is today the ac-
knowledged guide to which courts look when viewing the university/stu-
dent imbroglio. 10
The use of the contract theory as a justification of the university's fail-
ure to provide for disciplinary procedures meeting the minimal elements of
(1967) accepted the rationale that students, whose education is publicly financed, attend the
university on the basis of a privilege or benefit conferred upon them. From this the court per-
ceived the test of constitutional infringement to be:
whether conditions annexed to the benefit reasonably tend to further the purposes
sought by conferment of that benefit and whether the utility of imposing the condi-
tions manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of constitutional rights. 248
Cal. App. at 877.
G Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
0 McAuliffe v. Mayor & Board of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
7 Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
8 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928).
o Id. at 489; See also, 14 CJ.S. Colleges and Universities § 26 (1939).
10 Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962 ILL. L.F.
438. But see, Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968) which rejects the notion of a contractual relationship existing between the
student and the university.
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fairness is a tortured lesson in logic. The rationale of the contract theory
is that a student, by entering the university, enters into a contract, the terms
of which are expressed in the university's charter and the promulgated reg-
ulations governing student conduct.
The relationship existing between the university and the student is con-
tractual... ITlhere is implied in such contract a term or condition that
the student will not be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive
of the discipline of the college. ... 11
This "contract" of student status and its implicit waiver is at best an
exercise in legal fictions. With whom does the student make this contract?
Most courts have said the contract was made with the university. 12 But
there is no gainsaying that a prospective student and an institution do not
meet in the marketplace at arm's length like businessmen and negotiate the
terms of the ensuing student/university relationship. In reality, the pro-
spective student has no choice as to terms of attendance but is compelled
to adhere to the inflexible ones presented. Even then, the university is not
bound, for it retains the unlimited power to amend any term at any time.13
The contract theory is as far removed from the mainstream of contract
jurisprudence as would be a similar theory applied to marriage or a pur-
chase on the stock exchange. Further, the theory fails the most important
test served by the perpetuation of legal fictions. It is an ill-fitting category
which speaks only in conclusionary terms. It does not describe a relation-
ship, but like the privilege theory discussed above, it serves only as a ratio
decidendi to characterize the result. In this respect it does not aid a court
in arriving at a sound result. Thus, I fear, the contract theory is but a
gossamer web self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can
point.
Some courts have implied that the "contract" is made with the other
students.' 4 But how can this be? It seems absurd to suggest that each stu-
dent contracts with all other students at a university in a mutual waiver of
the right of freedom from arbitrary action which would otherwise be pro-
scribed by constitutional principles.
The Myth of In Loco Parentis
The classical American college was a place of serene social relationships
and scholarly detachment. The students of this classical college had their
11 Goldstein v. New York University, 76 App. Div. 80, 82, 78 N.Y. Supp. 739, 740 (1902).
12 15 Am. Jur. 2d, Colleges and Universities § 25 (1964); See also, Koblitz v. Western
Reserve University, 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144 (1901).
13 Dehaan v. Brandeis University, 150 F. Supp. 636 (D. Mass. 1957); Sampson v. Trustees
of Columbia University, 167 N.Y.S. 202, 203 (1917); See also, Anthony v. Syracuse University,
sapra note 8; People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 14 N.Y.S. 490, aff'd, 128
N.Y. 621 (1891).
14See e.g., Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925).
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place in a well-ordered hierarchy. In the bucolic setting of their splendid
isolation, the student indulged in the costly luxury and privilege of the lib-
eral arts and the administrator taught what he believed the students needed
to learn.
The student in this setting did not go to college; he was sent. His re-
lationship to the college was indeed a contractual one in that he was the
beneficiary of a contract between his parents and the university, which no
doubt gave rise to the discredited theory discussed above. The student's
parents became obligated to the university in return for the latter's promise
to provide a benefit to the student by way of educating him. Viewed in
that context, the beneficiary/student, the object of the charity, had no voice
over any incidents or terms of the contract. He was in no position to re-
quire anything or enforce any obligation against the college.
This classical image envisions an age in which parents took an assertive
and autocratic stance towards their children. Youth was recognized as an
incapacity within the cultural mode then extant. It was that very cultural
climate which underscored and reinforced the traditional student's sense of
his servile, child-like status in his relationship to his college.
Within such a referential frame, it is not difficult to understand how
the doctrine of in loco parentis came to grow and flourish in the United
States. The parent having given over his child to the college administrator
for the purpose of his education, these authorities came to act in lieu of
parents, empowered by law,' 5 custom, and usage to direct and control stu-
dent conduct to the same extent as a parent. It is thus easily understood
how this concept became embodied as an integral part of the administra-
tor's view of his relationship to the student. One highly regarded historian
has characterized the historical basis of in loco parentis thusly:
[It] was transferred from Cambridge to America .... College students
were, for the most part, very young. A great many boys went up to col-
lege in the Colonial era at the age of [thirteen]. They were . . .what
our high school youngsters are now. They did need taking care of, and
the tutors were in loco parentis. This habit was reinforced with the com-
ing of education for girls and of co-education.16
The widespread acceptance of the in loco parentis theory as a legal doc-
trine justifying the abstention of courts in student/university conflicts per-
sisted for a long time and is slow-dying. The principle was generally
stated in terms which said, "College authorities stand in loco parentis con-
cerning the physical and moral welfare and mental training of pupils....
[The] school, its officers and students are a legal entity, as much as any
family, and like a father may direct his children, those [school administra-
15 See e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376,161 S.W. 204 (1913).
16 Letter from Professor Henry Commager to Professor Van Alstyne in, Van AIstyne, Pro-
cedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368, 377-78 (1963).
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tors] are well within their rights and powers when they direct their stu-
dents .... ,17
Such rationale must fall of its own weight if the logical conclusion of
such a statement is read carefully. The actual power of the family unit is
framed within an idea of natural affection and restraint impelled by family
life. Moreover, the traditional prerogative of parents to deal summarily
with their own children is partly justified by the constant and recurring
contacts within the family circle. It would be ludicrous indeed to suggest
that every disciplinary event within the household be carried out using for-
malized procedures. It would be difficult at best to persuasively suggest
that the interests of a university in the conduct of its students is as constant,
detailed, or intimate as in the family circle. Surely the law will not permit
parents to "suspend" or "expel" a child from the home. To attempt to
"throw out" a child would subject the parent to criminal prosecution. If
the university wishes to justify its unilateral action under the doctrine of in
loco parentis, it should be prepared to accept the proscriptions of the legal
limits of due process in so doing.
The rationale applied in many instances for the institutional use of the
doctrine rests on the implied supposition that students are without legal
capacity. Viewed statistically, this assertion can simply not be seriously ad-
vanced. Today's university students have a median age hovering around
twenty years, and the number of students who have attained their majority
exceeds one million.18 The university students of today comprise a total of
almost 25% of the nation's population between 18-24 years.,' It is also
significant to note that graduate and professional students are ordinarily
accorded no more due process in disciplinary matters than their undergrad-
uate colleagues, and the average age of the former group is above 22
years.2°
The common assertion that the institution's extraordinary power is one
entrusted to it by parents is indefensible. Certainly it is difficult to imagine
that parents either demand or could reasonably expect that large univer-
sities with their student bodies of ten or twenty thousand or more, the ma-
jority of whom live off campus, should stand in the place of the parent and
closely supervise their "children." Even were this fallacy correct and the
notion of in loco parentis made to rest on the presumed desire of the par-
ents and a literal delegation of their authority, it is safe conjecture that the
17 Gott v. Berea College, supra note 15; See generally, Stetson v. Hunt, supra note 14;
Anthony v. Syracuse, supra note 8; State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433
(1928); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932); Tanton v. McKinney, 226
Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 Ad. 882 (1924);
Vermilion v. State ex rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
18 Based on U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
July 24, 1961.
19 Id.
20Old.
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same parents would not want their children expelled or suspended without
a full measure of due process in the decision making routine of the univer-
sity. Such a method of application has too much of the flavor of throwing
out the baby with the bath.
The logical extension of the doctrine leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that while minor students are subject to the university's exercise of
power under the doctrine, the adult student would be beyond reach due to
his age. At no university is such an anomalous situation known to exist.
To use the doctrine as a justification to preclude an adherence to procedural
due process as a constitutional prerequisite to sanctioning, is tantamount to
asserting that it can apply in other areas of a student's citizenship. Take
as an example a student's protected right to be free from an unreasonable
search. If in loco parentis can be applied to minor students living on the
campus proper, the logical extension of the doctrine makes it likewise ap-
plicable to those minor students living in the off-campus community as pri-
vate residents. This would be so because the power in the university is
bottomed on status vis-a-vis location. It is specious to claim that a univer-
sity administrator is legally empowered to knock at a student's off-campus
home and demand to conduct a search in loco parentis. Even the most fre-
quently cited case to support this doctrine renders it a nullity in the posed
situation.21
Further, it should be recognized that today's university students come
from social classes and national and racial backgrounds never before pres-
ent on campuses in such numbers. These students are not only bright and
mature, but have become newly aware of their political power. The ex-
pression and imposition of such a false and potentially arbitrary doctrine
as in loco parentis serves only to further alienate these students from our
traditional values. The character of the university student body has been
and is currently undergoing a radical change which acts to strain even more
the traditional organization of university authority where the doctrine is
used as university policy.
Today's student is not only older than the student at the time of the
doctrine's adoption, but he has experienced more of life. He comes from
family backgrounds which have been largely caught up in the economic and
social struggles of today's world. The style of family life is vastly different
from that of the classical days. He has been brought up in a family circle
where life is more open and honest; he has become more aware of what
life is really all about. He has had the advantage of better primary and
secondary education. And finally, he is the product of the communications
revolution; he is a child of television and the film industries which have
brought the whole spectrum of human life and emotions to him. He has
been a vicarious witness to the whole play of political passions, love, ha-
2 1 Stetson University v. Hunt supra note 14.
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tred, war, bloodshed, discrimination, and deprivation. The students of
today have received the media's message and they exhibit its influence in
their maturity of bearing and purpose.
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that, legally or otherwise, the
doctrine of in loco parentis is indefensible as a rationale for a university's
failure to provide a semblance of due process based on rudimentary fairness
in its disciplinary procedures; and that the doctrine cannot withstand a
dose and analytical scrutiny. 2 The doctrine of in loco parentis is based on
reasoning that is as much out of place today as a belief that the earth is
flat.
Granting then that some mode of procedural due process is required of
a university in student sanctioning methods, what of the activities which
most often form the basis for the attempted sanctions? In today's univer-
sity setting the occasion for the attempted sanctioning of students arises
most often out of events in which the interest of the student and the uni-
versity dash. It is the student's action which takes on the hue of a color-
able constitutional exercise that will be examined below. The black ana
white of the earlier doctrines used to justify university action must, in to-
day's constitutional jurisprudence, be toned with shades of grey and the
heretofore presumed dear demarcation lines have shadows cast over them.
II. CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED STUDENT
ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS
Problems of Political Membership and Activity
As a preliminary question, one should examine the power of the uni-
versity in structuring its student populace. May a university establish re-
straints which, through their operation, will determine the make-up of its
student body?
Any educational institution imposes elaborate restraints upon students:
they must take certain courses in required sequence; they must maintain a
specified grade average; they must not cheat in the performance of their
academic tasks; they must return library books on time and not deface
them; they must maintain order in the residence halls; they may be required
to observe curfews; they may be subject to dress regulations, and subject to
smoking and drinking restrictions. None of these can be said to per se
violate a student's academic freedom since they are largely incidental to
learning activity. It cannot be said that any of these rules per se serve to
inhibit academic freedom. The thrust of these rules goes primarily to the
reasonable time, place, and manner of exercising private rights compatibly
22See Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968) which rejects the doctrine that a college stands in loco parentis to its students.
Rather, "the relationship grows out of the peculiar and sometimes competing interests of the
college and student." 284 F. Supp. at 729.
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with the university's business. If one can accept the reasonableness of these
rules, it can be said that their neutral enforcement is unobjectionable. But,
this type of normative operational university rule has at the maximum only
an incidental impact on any constitutional interests of a student. The at-
tendance or non-attendance of a student based upon such rules seems to
this writer to raise no problems of constitutional magnitude.
Conversely, one can envision a university regulation worded in self-
protective terms purporting to limit enrollment to those persons who pose
no subversive threat to the nation, state, or institution. Can a university
today restrain attendance due to the political party membership or political
activities of a student?
It should not be open to doubt that a university regulation purporting
to proscribe student membership in the Republican or Democratic parties
would be short-lived. A similar result would obviously occur if a total pro-
hibition on student political activity was sought to be mandated. The ques-
tion becomes superficially less clear when the regulation is phrased in such
terms as: admission or re-admission shall be denied to any applicant who
exhibits subversive tendencies or who advocates, teaches, etc., the doctrine
that the United Staes government or the government of this state, etc.,
should be overthrown by force or violence or any unlawful means. By
seeking to so structure its student body to preclude such persons who may
come within the criteria of this fictional standard, is the university acting
within acceptable constitutional principles? While this question has never
been directly answered, it has been analogously raised in other contexts.
These analogous situations have generally been concerned with teachers'
membership but the analysis is easily transposable.
That a state has a legitimate interest in protecting its educational sys-
tem from subversion is well recognized.23 However, the state has generally
been denied the carte blanche which such a recognition could be taken to
imply. This denial has not been based on the purpose detailed above, but
rather on the constitutional magnitude of the restrictions which such a regu-
lation normally engenders. The Supreme Court has recognized the stifling
effect that is caused by a sweeping proscription against the presence of un-
popular or even subversive political viewpoints in the classroom. "The
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The nation's future de-
pends upon leaders trained through a wide exposure to [al robust exchange
of ideas." 4 Implicit in the theory that a university is the marketplace of
ideas, is the idea that to circumscribe the limits of inquiry, study, and evalua-
ion would be to curtail society's opportunity to gain new maturity and un-
derstanding. The ultimate effect of such a limitation would be to place our
intellectual leaders, extant and potential, in an academic strait jacket which
23 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
241d. at 603.
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
could only act to imperil our future as a nation.2 5 In the cases dealing
with teachers' membership in organizations sought to be castigated as sub-
versive,26 the attempted dismissal was based on the assumption that the
teacher abused his position of trust by acting to bring about an avoidable
evil. In viewing these cases, the Supreme Court sought to draw clearly the
distinction between advocacy that combined doctrinal justification of future
violent action with exhortation to immediate action, vis-a-vis the mere ex-
ercise of the former. 7 It is only the latter element which makes operative
the acceptance of means by the state calculated to protect itself; in this case
its educational system.
It would seem clear that the attempt by a university to exclude a stu-
dent on the basis of the purported regulation would contravene the limits
of first amendment rights of association. The rationale that guilt by
association has no place in our society"8 is surely as applicable to stu-
dents within the university community as it is to teachers. A regulation
which seeks to, in effect, sanction a student through denial of enrollment
based on political beliefs or associations is an unnecessary infringement on
first amendment and academic freedoms unless it can be clearly shown that
the student has the "specific intent to further the illegal aims of [hisl or-
ganization."- '
Recognition of the constitutional support of the "right of association"
is of relatively recent date. This came about in the 1958 decision of
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.30 In that case the State of Alabama
sought to compel production of NAACP records. In writing for the court,
Mr. Justice Harlan initially treated freedom of association as a derivative
of the first amendment rights of speech and assembly.
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particu-
larly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as
this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close
nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly .... It is beyond de-
bate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.31
In the remainder of his opinion, however, Mr. Justice Harlan elevated free-
dom of association to an independent right, possessing an equal status with
the other rights enumerated in the first amendment. He repeatedly used
25 See, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, esp. at 250 (1957).
26 Whitehill v. ElIns, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents supra note 23;
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra note 25. See also, Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).27Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
28 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
29 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943).
30 3 5 7 U.S. 449 (1958).
31 Id. at 460.
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the phrase "freedom of association" by itself, and at one point carefully dis-
tinguished it by referring to "these indespensable liberties, whether of
speech, press or association."32 Thus, by the end of his opinion, it is dear
that the Court has established the 'constitutional right of association"
3 3
which subjects state control in relation to the individual to the traditional
constitutional limitations.
Placed in the context of the posed university regulation preventing en-
rollment of members of certain groups or holding "subversive" political
beliefs, one can paraphrase the opinion quoted above and ask the necessary
and determinative question: In light of the likelihood of substantial re-
straint upon the exercise of the student's freedom of association, can the
university demonstrate an interest in excluding this student sufficient to
justify the deterrent effect on this constitutionally protected right? In other
words, the test must be a broad balancing of associational rights against
university interests. In no case where mere membership is the criterion for
exclusion can this writer weigh the balance in favor of the interests con-
trary to those of the student.
The political orthodoxy which such a posited regulation, if valid, would
impose is anathema to the nature of academic freedom. Within the uni-
versity, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. The very
essence of the institution is epitomized by the spirit of free inquiry: to fol-
low the argument wherever it may lead; to examine, question, and dispute
customary ideas and beliefs. To the student, no less than to the scholar,
unchallengeable dogma and hypothesis are fundamentally incompatible.
The concept of immutable doctrine is repugnant to the very spirit of a uni-
versity. "The concern of [students] is not merely to add or revise facts
in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modi-
fying the framework itself." 34
In the case of a student who is sought to be sanctioned or excluded for
unpopular political activity, the standard should be much higher than for
a teacher before a permissible university interest can be justified. The stu-
dent has no forum, such as a classroom, with its captive audience over
whom he exercises authority. The student does not accept a salary from
the state and is not entrusted with the state's interest in educating its youth.
The student can only seek his forum and his audience on-campus through
the exercise of first amendment rights. He can only seek to be heard and
heeded in the open market of thoughtful interchange and discussion. The
dulling effects of censorship through the sanctioning process upon the on-
campus activist student are more to be feared than the quickening influence
of a live interchange of ideas.
2 Id. at 461.
331d. at 463.
34 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra note 25 at 263 (concurring opinion).
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Viewed in this perspective, it can be seen that a student's claim for aca-
demic freedom regarding his political activities really translates itself into
a demand for protection, not only for himself, but for society's right to
hear what he has to say. The student's academic freedom, in the sense of
being free to pursue whatever political philosophy is relevant to him, con-
stitutes the very core of that freedom of speech and association so basic to
a free society and so carefully safeguarded by the first amendment.
Recognition of Student Groups
Granting that the constitutionally underscored associational right exists,
a brief examination should be made concerning the university's power to
withhold recognition from those groups which do form within the student
body. Even the bare right to form an associational group would seem to
be dependent upon the character of the organization. Thus, if the objec-
tive of the organization is entirely illegal, for example to steal and sell li-
brary books, the university could probably prohibit the mere formation of
the group upon pain of expulsion or exclusion. The question becomes less
clear in the case of an organization which forms and has several objectives,
some of which are legal and some illegal. For example, the campus for-
mation of a chapter of the extremist Minutemen or Black Panther groups
may have as companion objectives the advocacy of violence and the active
engagement in gathering arms and teaching their use. The significant
point here is that it is impossible to construct a meaningful constitutional
limitation on university power based on a generalized notion of the right
to form an association. The legal doctrine that protects associational rights
must be able to distinguish between them and afford the required measure
of protection in each case.
In recognizing that freedom of association is for students, as well as
other citizens, "part of the bundle of rights protected by the First Amend-
ment,"2 5 one can logically assert that the university, like any other agent
of government, can intervene in the posed situation only when "belief,
thought, or expression moves into the realm of action that is inimical to
society." ''  Surely the university cannot broadly prohibit students with
common interests from joining together in group advocacy, thus the logical
corollary must be that for the university to choose to recognize some groups
and refuse to recognize others is an indirect intrusion on associational free-
doms which would be impermissible if attempted directly. The outer limits
of acceptable regulation will be discussed later in some detail, but basi-
35 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 568-69 (Douglas, J.
concurring, 1963). See also, Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
36 Gibson v. Florida Legislation Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 573. (Douglas, J.
Concurring).
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cally, such regulation must be a reasonable limitation on the time, place,
and manner of the exercise of group advocacy. If reasonable, these regu-
lations are undeniably a matter of legitimate concern to the university and
their impact on the expressional and associational rights being pursued are,
or should be, too remote to act as an infringement thereon.
In perspective, the shifting public opinion might be satisfied if by
non-recognition the university were able to stifle unpopular viewpoints on
the campus. It is precisely here, however, that the protections of the first
amendment come into play, serving as a shield both for those who would
express unpopular or unsound views and for those who, while profoundly
disagreeing with those views, would protect the right to express them. The
university which views its position in such a light, despite pressures to the
contrary, upholds the great principles that underlie the first amendment;
principles long ago expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in one of his land-
mark dissenting opinions:
'When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our sal-
vation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigi-
lant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country. .. .
Student Loyalty Oaths as Prerequisite to Enrollment
The requirement by a university that as a condition of enrollment each
student execute a loyalty oath would be reflective of a basic misunderstand-
ing of the educational process. It would be a serious omission to disregard
the import of the fundamental issue involved in such a regulation. For
upon the resolution of that issue turns not only a rational view of loyalty
oaths, but the potential success of our educational system in achieving its
goals. Simply stated, the fundamental cleavage is this: there can be no
agreement between those people who regard education as a means of in-
stilling and propagating certain definite and approved beliefs, and those
other people who think that, above all else, education should produce a
disciplined and critical mind with the power of independent judgment.as
37 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
as See, Chafee, The Blessings of Liberty 241 (1956): "The government pays judges, but it
does not tell them how to decide. An independent ... university is as essential to the com-
munity as an independent judiciary."
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A university which would prescribe a loyalty oath as a condition of en-
rollment, consciously or unconsciously, would lend its support to the first
view. In its fervor to cope with what may be perceived as the threat to
our free institutions, the university has as its aim the assurance that only
those people who espouse "Americanism" will be among its student body,
believing that by so doing, our institutions of liberty can be saved and per-
petuated. This philosophy is guilty of the error of confusing loyalty with
mere orthodoxy. In exhibiting the fear and distrust of student political
beliefs, the university which promulgates such a rule of admission comes
very near being as doctrinaire as the subversive influences it seeks to quell.
Inherent in such a regulation is the definition of loyalty as the non-existence
of dissent and political diversity.
Two arresting justifications for a student loyalty oath requirement are:
(1) the subversive student is committed to the destruction of democratic
institutions, including academic freedom, and is therefore not entitled to
the privileges of academic freedom, and (2) the subversive student is a
member of a criminal conspiracy and therefore should be excluded from
the educational facilities provided by the state.39
The first argument for automatic exclusion may be more cogently para-
phrased in a slogan: "No freedom for the enemies of freedom. '40  The
grievance here is that a subversive person should dare raise the banner of
academic freedom in his defense, when it is well known that academic free-
dom would not be tolerated under the political and social system which he
advocates. This raises the curious spectre of granting academic freedom
only to those people who believe in it. There is no more reason to make
belief in academic freedom a condition of sharing in the concept than there
would in making belief in the efficacy of a wonder drug a condition for tak-
ing the drug. More important is the belief that if the ideals of our society
are valid, they can withstand criticism, especially subversive criticism. In
this regard, the observation is relevant that ". . . if we silence him [the
advocate of totalitarian institutionsi we have actually abrogated freedom
of speech, whereas he has merely talked about doing so."41
The second argument advanced to support the loyalty oath was treated
above. This ground states an assumption not acceptable to the courts; that
all membership is culpable, and that mere membership or knowing partici-
pation in a subversive group is proof of personal guilt in seeking to achieve
those unlawful goals.
Both of these rationale show a fundamental ambivalence toward edu-
cation. On the one hand, the university seeks to assure itself that, notwith-
standing the present conflict with totalitarianism, it will remain free and
39 Ralph S. Brown, Loyalty and Security 340 (1958).
40 Id. at 341.
4 1 F. Mackulp, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic F eedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL.
781 (1951).
[Vol. 31
FIRST AMENDMENT
courageous in its educational pursuits. Yet, on the other hand, the univer-
sity seeks to reach this admirable goal by controlled conformity through
the populating of its own academic community with only those students
(and presumably faculty) who possess opinions and attitudes labeled
"Americanism" or "antisubversive."
It should become obvious that such a view cannot be co-existent with
the survival of the constitutional protection afforded academic freedom.
The attempt to teach democratic values by means of indoctrination and
propaganda has been held to have the vice of unconstitutionality within
it. The same consideration ought to prevail in the equally fundamental
area of student selection and admission where the only criteria should be
intellectual competence and potential.
This question is entirely speculative since the loyalty oath question as
to the enrollment of students has not arisen. However, should such a ques-
tion appear, the Court should strike the balance in favor of academic free-
dom. Such a view would allow for the realization of the advice of Thomas
Jefferson when he said that a university should be based on "... . the illimit-
able freedom of the human mind .... We are not afraid to follow truth
wherever it may lead, nor [should we be afraid] to tolerate any error so
long as reason is left free to combat it."'43
The agents of subversion have done nothing to our universities or their
students which is potentially more dangerous than what the university, in
the posed situation, out of fearful insecurity, has done to itself. "To strike
freedom of the mind with the fist of patriotism is an old and ugly sub-
lety."44 Mr. Justice Black, in Weiman v. Updegraff, articulated the writer's
thesis regarding loyalty oaths generally and in the posited situation spe-
cifically by saying: "Test oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. When used
to shackle the mind they are... unspeakably odious to a free people."4
Use of University Facilities by Student Organizations
If a university elected not to allow the use of its facilities for all non-
academic purposes there would seem to be little ground to support a stu-
dent allegation of first amendment infringement. A uniform and univer-
sally applied policy of not .opening university buildings after hours to
student groups of any kind appears to be within the power of control over
state property which is invested in the institution. The state, and therefore
the university, is not under a duty to make its facilities available for public
gatherings but, if it elects to do so, it is constitutionally required to grant
4 2 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 196 (H. A. Washington ed. 1853-54).
44 Adlai Stevenson, Speeches 82 (1952).
45 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952).
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the use of these facilities "in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner,
equally applicable to all and administered with equality to all." 40
All that has been said above concerning the freedom of speech and as-
sociation as those protected privileges pertain to students would be of little
value if the state through its university officials were able to effectively pre-
vent their exercise by having the discretionary license over the use of its
forums. The university acting in the role of censor is out of its medium.
It is logical to assume that if the university is proscribed from regulating
the speech and associational rights of students, except as a sufficient interest
justifies, tlien it is likewise prohibited from denying an otherwise available
forum to achieve the same end. The duty of the university, in such a cir-
cumstance as this, would appear to be the administrative function of rea-
sonably regulating the use of its buildings as to such matters as hours, num-
ber of persons so as to comply with safety requirements, etc. However, the
present state of our constitutional jurisprudence makes argument unneces-
sary to establish the assumption the university may not discriminate against
an organization simply because the institution, or even a calculable part of
the community, may be hostile to the opinions or program of such an or-
ganization.
One must inquire why an institution would seek to prohibit an unpopular
or "subversive" group from holding meetings or programs in its buildings
when presumably they can hold them elsewhere without arousing fears of
baneful consequences. Is it reasonable to suppose that meetings which
would be harmless if held elsewhere would take on an especially sinister
quality in a school building? When one searches deeper for the reason
that motivates the prohibition, there is no escaping the conclusion that de-
nial is based not on the fear that the meetings or programs pose a clear and
present danger to the university community, but because the institutional
authorities believe the privilege of free and nondiscriminatory assembly
should be denied to those whose convictions and affiliations should not be
tolerated. Since the university cannot compel a renunciation of convictions
and affiliations as prerequisites to enrollment, a paraphrase of Hannegan v.
Esquire47 is here relevant to the effect that the university cannot regulate
through its custodial power over its facilities the freedom of assembly and
association which, if attempted directly, would contravene constitutional
principles. In dealing with a situation such as herein posed, the institution
should not be heard to argue that off-campus facilities are available to the
prohibited groups. "The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows." 8
There is a dose analogy between seeking to prohibit the use of school
facilities to certain groups and the attempted suppression of such a public
46 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966).
47 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
4 8 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1866).
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meeting by criminal prosecution held invalid in De longe v. Oregon. 9  In
that case, a defendant was convicted of presiding over a public meeting
held under the auspices of an organization advocating criminal syndicalism,
even though the meeting itself was not devoted to that advocacy. The
Supreme Court in reversing the conviction held that:
While the states are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the
privileges of our institutions ... none of our decisions go to the length
of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly.
... These rights may be abused by using speech or assembly in order to
incite to violence or crime. The people . . . may protect themselves
against that abuse.... [T]he rights themselves must not be curtailed.50
If the student organization has committed crimes elsewhere, if they
have gathered to engage in or are engaged in a conspiracy against the pub-
lic order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy under law. But it is
totally different to seek to proscribe such assembly based on the disapproval
of the group's objectives and affiliations.51
The public university which holds itself out to the community as the
training ground of tomorrow's leaders and, on the contrary, seeks to pro-
mulgate and enforce a proscriptive regulation such as the one here specu-
lated is in a most anomalous and untenable situation at best. Indeed,
when the principles of free speech and assembly are at stake, the university
has more to gain than to lose by a generous tolerance of the convictions and
affiliations of its student groups so long as these groups present no dear
and present danger to the academic or social community.52
It is of little merit to hear the counter assertion that there can be no
infringement on first amendment exercises because the university is only
raising an unmet criterion as a condition precedent to the use of its facil-
ities. Here the university's sole criterion upon which it conditions the use
of its facilities is that those who use the facilities refrain from the advocacy
of subversive doctrine. As will be seen in some detail later, the Supreme
Court has rejected the argument that states, and their subordinate parts,
are free from constitutional limitations in determining the conditions upon
which benefits or privileges will be granted, stating in Sherbert v. Verner, 3
"It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of... expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing conditions upon a benefit or privi-
lege."54
49 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
50 id. at 364.
51 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 171 P.2d 885 (1946); See also, Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).5 2 See generally, East Meadow Community Concerts Assoc. v. Board of Education Dist. 3,
18 N.Y.2d 129, 219 N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.2d 341 (1966), re-a!ffd per curiam after remand, 19
N.Y.2d 605, 224 N.E.2d 888, 278 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
Dist. supra note 51.
63 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54 Id. at 404; See also, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
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Student Invitations to Controversial Speakers
No single issue in the continuing debate over academic freedom for stu-
dents has aroused more recent attention than the invitation of off-campus
speakers. Students state their platform:
U. S. National Student Association supports the right to hear in live con-
frontation an off-campus speaker enunciate any opinion, regardless of its
public popularity and regardless of the speaker's political beliefs or as-
sociations, his intellectual merits, or the possibility of causing a public dis-
turbance.55
The American Association of University Professors backs them up:
Any person who is presented by a recognized student organization should
be allowed to speak on a college or university campus. Institutional con-
trol of the use of campuus facilities by studuent organizations for meet-
ings and other organizational purposes should not be employed as a de-
vice to censor or prohibit controversial speakers or the discussion of con-
troversial topics. The only controls which may be imposed are those
required by orderly scheduling of the use of space.56
Finally, the American Civil Liberties Union supports the student posi-
tion:
Students should be accorded the right to assemble, to select speakers and
to discuss issues of their choice. When a student organization wishes to
invite an outside speaker it should give sufficient notice to the college ad-
ministration. The latter may properly inform the group's leaders of its
views in the matter but should leave the final decision to them. Permis-
sion should not be withheld because the speaker is a controversial figure.
It can be made clear to the public that an invitation to a speaker does
not necessarily imply approval of his views by either the student group or
the college administration. Students should enjoy the same right as other
citizens to hear different points of view and draw their own conclusions.
At the same time, faculty members and college administrators may if they
wish acquaint students with the nature of the organizations and causes
that seek to enlist student support.57
Universities have traditionally served as public forums. The college
platform has been a favorite place to launch many of our society's most
profound visions, far-reaching programs, and, sometimes, most bitter at-
tacks. The preference of speakers for the university platform reflects so-
ciety's recognition of the dignity of the academic atmosphere, its traditions
supra note 28; Speiser v. Randal, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educa-
tion, 350 U.S.; 551 (1956).
55 Student Dimensions, Codification of Policy of the United States National Student As-
sociation, U.S.N.S.A. 115 (1963-64).
56American Association of University Professors, Committee "S," Statement on Faculty
Responsibility for the Academic Freedom of Students, 50 A.A.U.P. BULL. 255.
57 Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities, A.C.L.U.,
7 (1963).
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of free speech and fair play, and the respect which society's leaders have
for college students and faculty. Winston Churchhill delivered his famous
"Iron Curtain" speech in 1946 at Westminster College in Fulton, Mis-
souri. Senator Joseph McCarthy often used the college forum, as did the
late President Kennedy and the 1964 Republican nominee Barry Gold-
water. Advocates of free love, free land, and free spending have spoken
to college audiences, as have atheists, agnostics, Paul Tillich, and Karl
Barth. John Birchers and Communists, Madame Nhu and Margaret Chase
Smith, Harry Belafonte and Governor George Wallace have spoken at one
or another of our colleges. It was at Syracuse University that President
Johnson first spelled out American policy concerning Vietnam.
Because views expressed on the campus by public figures extend beyond
the campus in their impact, the proper use of this platform is a source of
discussion and sometimes division and discontent among students, faculty,
trustees, legislators, parents, alumni, contributors, citizens, and community
groups.
Controversial speakers present another kind of danger for the institu-
tion which is closely linked with the danger of destroying the contemplative
academic atmosphere. The university is under constant public scrutiny and,
as one administrator laments, "People have not learned to distinguish be-
tween 'the college' and the people to whom it would allow a platform."
This confusion between the college as a platform for controversial opinions
and the college as an advocate of these opinions often takes place. Since
it is not dear to the public that listening to radical viewpoints does not im-
ply approval of them, but rather provides case studies for scholarly analysis,
citizens' cries of protest sadly miss the point. One lady asked Chancellor
Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago whether it was a fact that
communism was taught in his university. He replied, "Yes, madam, and
we also teach cancer at our medical school."58'
The attempt to regulate the use of universities has largely been aimed
at the potential speaker who is unpopular because of his political reputa-
tion and affiliations. The restrictive regulation used as the basis for denial
of its facilities as a forum is commonly a product of the state legislature.
An illustrative example can be found in the famous, or, depending on your
point of view, the infamous, Illinois Clabaugh Act.5 9 That act provides:
No trustee, official, instructor, or other employee of the University of
Illinois shall extend to any subversive, seditious, and un-American organi-
zation, or to its representatives, the use of any facilities of the University
for the purpose of carrying on, advertising or publicizing the activities
of such organization. 60
5S Quoted in, E. G. Williamson and J. L Cowan, The American Student's Freedom of Ex-
pression: A Research Appraisal, at 65 (1967).
r9 ILL. REV. STATs. 1967, ch. 144 § 48.8.
00 See also, N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 1207 §§ 116-199,200 (1963), which reads:
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While current constitutional theories suggest that such an act is consti-
tutionally defective, it has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny. How-
ever, in analysis, several of its provisions seem untenable. What, for ex-
ample, is a "subversive, seditious, and un-American organization?" The
Act provides no definition. 1 By its failure to do so it unquestionably has
a discouraging effect on the exercise of speech and association due to the
probability that student organizations may well be convinced not to invite
speakers whom they believe may express unpopular views fearing that
through their host/guest relationship they too will be labeled "subversive,
seditious, and un-American."
Once again, as with individual political beliefs and affiliations and
group recognition, the fact that certain opinions are unpopular or even "un-
American" in the sense that they are at variance with the views currently
held by most Americans does not deprive them of their protected status
under the first amendment." The vagueness of the Clabaugh Act in par-
ticular and similar acts in general may thus be said to have a chilling effect
on constitutionally permissible speech.6 3
Traditionally, the standard applied by the Supreme Court in judging
the constitutionality of restraints on speech has taken the following form:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils [the university) has a right
AN ACT TO REGULATE VISITING SPEAKERS AT
STATE SUPPORTED COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
Section 1. No college or university, which receives any state funds in support
thereof, shall permit any person to use the facilities of such college or university for
speaking purposes, who:
(A) Is a known member of the Communist Party;
(B) Is known to advocate the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States or
the State of North Carolina;
(C) Has pleaded the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in
refusing to answer any question, with respect to communist or subversive connec-
tions, or activities, before any duly constituted legislative committee, any judicial tri-
bunal, or any executive or administrative board of the United States or any state.
61 In this respect a number of recent decisions have examined college regulations for vague-
ness and overbreadth in infringing upon first amendment freedoms. See e.g., Soglin v.
Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) holding that misconduct is a standard for student
expulsion which is too vague when applied to the regulation of protected freedoms; and more
specifically, Smith v. University of Tennessee, 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) holding
that regulations by which an invited speaker was rejected were too broad and vague, thus con-
stituting an unconstitutional restraint on first amendment rights.
62 See, Dunbar v. Governing Board of the Grossmont Junior College District, 275 Cal.
App.2d 5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1969) which held that a college governing board could not ex-
dude a student-invited speaker merely for his being a member of the Communist Party. Apply-
ing the protection of the first amendment, the court felt that membership in any organization,
no matter how unpopular is not sufficient reason by itself to prevent students from hearing a
given speaker in an open debate.
63 See unpublished memorandum, Faculty, College of Law, University of Illinois, Goldberg
and La Fave, March 6, 1967.
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to prevent."' 1 The Court has more recently adopted a modification of this
standard by substituting the probability of grave evil for clear and present
danger. "In each case the courts must ask whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." 5 Thus modified the requirement of prov-
ing imminent danger is reduced to a showing, for example, that the evil
will occur tomorrow rather than today."
Universities have experienced difficulty with both parts of the testOT
They have improperly identified the kinds of evil that are constitutionally
within their power to prevent, and they have failed to develop standards
by which to isolate speakers whose presence on campus will probably incite
violence.
The university, inter alia, can surely punish students who assault or
sabotage university property. Likewise, the state can punish persons who
do similar acts against state interests. If the student-invited speaker was
one who made such action (the evil) highly probable, the university should
be able to restrain the speech (the probability of its occurance). However,
it would be unconstitutional for the university to sanction students who
advocate, urge, or incite others to act in a legal and lawful manner to effect
a change unpopular to the university. An invited speaker who does the
same thing should be likewise protected no matter how strongly his ideas
are detested by the university or state.68
Thus, the various derivatives of the Clabaugh Act prevent speeches on
the campus by many who hold unpopular views but who nonetheless advo-
cate lawful conduct only. 9 Repeal of the McCarran Act or the Clabaugh
Act by a vote of the appropriate legislative body could not be punished.
Speeches which urge their elimination by lawful means are likewise invio-
late. Since the type of action urged by the speaker is not censurable,
neither can the university acting as a spokesman for the prevailing majority,
in order to insulate itself from change, censor or bar the speech designed
to bring about such action.
04 Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); accord, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937); Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
65 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,510 (1951).
00 See Frantz, The First A-mendnzent in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
07 There can be no doubt that the application of the first amendment to the states through the
fourteenth is likewise incumbent upon state universities. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); one court, in dictum, has
suggested that the fourteenth amendment may also be applicable to private universities. But
such a consideration is beyond the scope of this paper. See Guillory v. Tulane University 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
68See Brooks v. Auburn University, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) where the absence of
allegations that a speaker's appearance would lead to violence and disorder was significant. The
court held the speaker could not be barred solely on the professed grounds that he was a con-
victed felon and might advocate breaking the law.
O9 See Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941).
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A comprehensive ban such as the cited acts prescribe are constitutionally
defective precisely because of their comprehensive and undiscriminating
nature. These proscriptive regulations fail to distinguish between the po-
litical advocacy urged by the speaker and the resultant conduct. Thus, the
ban is aimed at the speaker rather than the course of the conduct likely to
result from the speech. This goes too far. It ignores not only the nature
of the action urged, but also the "probability" requirement of the Supreme
Court test described above. One should logically extend the "probability"
criterion to include constitutional protection for a speaker, who although
well known for his desire for violent overthrow of our system, is invited to
speak on a topic far removed from that political goal. He should not be
barred on this occasion because the speech he proposes to make will carry
no probability of incitation to violence or unlawful action."'
There remains another purported justification for barring certain stu-
dent-invited controversial speakers from use of university speaking facil-
ities. It is based on the idea that although the speaker himself may not
urge or incite violence, those who oppose his views would precipitate the
violence. Superficially, this reactive form of violence would seem to
equally justify suppression due to the threat of disorder. This theory is not
without some limited degree of constitutional support.7 1 However, the ap-
plication of this idea should be very narrowly limited to those occasions
where opposition to the speaker "rises far above public inconvenience, an-
noyance, or unrest."72 The widespread application of such an idea would
simply invite those who would suppress the speaker's exercise of free
speech to create the threat needed to justify offiidal restraint by the univer-
sity. The Supreme Court has made equally dear the concept that "consti-
tutional rights are not to be sacrificed or yielded to ... violence and dis-
order." 3
It has been said earlier regarding the use of university facilities by stu-
dent groups, and it will be mentioned again below in another context, that
a university has no obligation to allow the extracurricular use of its facil-
ities. However, the legal duty of non-discriminatory standards arises when
such facilities are made available.' To paraphrase the Supreme Court, the
question here is not a duty of the university to supply speaking facilities,
but of its duty when it provides such facilities to furnish them upon die
basis of an equality of right.7 5
Aside from the constitutional questions, one should ask, in evaluating
70 See De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 64.
7 1 See Niernotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 esp. at 289 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951).
72 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
7 3 Cooper v. Aaron, supra note 67.
74 See cases cited in footnote 52.
75 Paraphrasing, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938).
[Vol. 31
FIRST AMENDMENT
the imposition of a Clabaugh Act or a university promulgated regulation
barring certain speakers from campus forums, whether or not the action
violates commonly accepted principles of academic freedom.
A university is often considered to function solely in order to transmit
an intellectual heritage and, in so doing, to enrich it. The advocates of
these restrictive laws insist that the university does not owe subversive or
un-American persons the right to promote their cause from state platforms.
But more important than what the university does not owe these unpopular
people and causes is what it does owe its students. It owes them the evi-
dence of a conviction that there has been found no better means of ascer-
taining the truth than the response of the public to the open forum. Of
course, that response is by no means infallible, but democracy is based on
the assumption that it is far less fallible than any authoritarian judge.
Speaker bans suggest that the university cannot trust to the freedom of in-
quiry and that its authoritarian judgment should replace the open forum.
These restrictive provisions, while not affecting classroom discussion or fac-
ulty research, surely have an adverse and negative effect on the academic
environment. The free flow of ideas, so inherent in the university, is im-
paired. Such impairment can only act to deny to the student the oppor-
tunity to sharpen and enlarge his mental faculties through healthy personal
dialogue with these spokesmen of variant views. The resultant anti-intel-
lectualism70 can only work to the disadvantage of our educational process
and indeed, our future as a free thinking, tolerant people. John Stuart
Mill's classic point applies here:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.
If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchang-
ing error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
70 The conviction among some citizens that radicals should be denied the university forum
is mirrored in the creation of an Emergency Committee to Halt the Spread of Nazism in
American Colleges and Universities, a group dedicated to silencing the late George Lincoln
Rockwell. The statement of the purpose of the organization reads in part:
College and university students are simply too ill-informed and immature to be
allowed to judge Rockwell themselves. He is too slick for them and too pat-too
devilishly clever to permit students to expose themselves to him. To allow college
and university students to hear Rockwell is NOT "free speech." It is exactly like
letting babies sample poisoned candy. They don't know enough-they haven't ex-
perience enough-to judge for themselves whether they should even try a sample
... the average college student, while he feels himself well-informed and mature in
judgment is actually a born sucker for the kind of slick facts and "Alice in Won-
derland" arguments of demagogues like Rockwell. J. Carlson and J. Cohen, Emer-
gency Committee to Halt the Spread of Nazism in American Colleges and Universities,
Mimeograph at 3, (1964).
This quotation gives a good indication of the depth of feeling that inspires the antipathy of
some community groups, and their consequent persistence. A college administrator who wishes
to implement a liberal interpretation of freedom of speech at his campus invites the antag-
onism of these groups whose outcries can, if the community at large is receptive, do much to
limit his freedom in decision-making.
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the dearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its col-
lision with error.77
III. ISCELLANEOUS AND DEMONSTRATIVE STUDENT ACTIVITIES
HAVING FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
1. A student newspaper editor, against the counsel of a faculty advisor
and in violation of a known university policy, published a well written edi-
torial containing criticism of the Governor and the state legislature. The
university rule which the student violated proscribed only adverse editor-
ials, not those laudatory of state governmental activities. Disciplinary ac-
tion is now sought against the student based on the theory that since the
state is the owner of the university and its newspaper, the proscriptive rule
is valid and enforceable.
2. An adult female university student was employed as a model by a
well known men's magazine. In a city distant from the university campus
the female student posed for several pictures which ultimately appeared in
the magazine. One of these pictures shows the student in an artistic pose
semi-nude on a sand dune. The university now seeks to impose sanctions
upon the student for what it calls "conduct unbecoming to a lady."
The above situations pose a not untypical theoretical problem in today's
university community which leads to the question in the university/student
context: What substantive regulations may a university impose on a stu-
dent's speech and speech related activities and remain consistent with con-
stitutional principles?
The problem raised by the female student's activity involves the off-
campus power of a university to impose sanctions on students for conduct
that is otherwise legitimate when engaged in by a non-student. Therefore,
the power, if it exists at all, must be based on an overriding interest by the
institution, authorized by the student/university status then extant. This
type of off-campus power will be examined later.
The problems inherent in the situation of the college newspaper editor
raise the thus far unanswered questions: To what extent is student aca-
demic freedom supported by constitutional underpinnings? What are the
limits beyond which institutional authorities cannot go in deterring student
actions which, in areas outside the institutional community, would dearly
be protected by the first amendment against interference from other state
machinery?
The U. S. National Student Association has been continually interested
in student academic freedom and recently endorsed a joint Statement of
Rights and Freedoms of Students approved by the Council of the American
Association of University Professors. In pertinent part the statement
reads:
77 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 16 (Crofts Classics ed. 1947).
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Academic institutions exist for the transmission of knowledge, the pur-
suit of truth, the development of students, and the general well-being of
society. Free inquiry and free expression are indispensable to the attain-
ment of these goals. As members of the academic community, students
should be encouraged to develop the capacity for critical judgment and to
engage in a sustained and independent search for truth.78
Courts have shown no reluctance to settle controversies involving first
amendment rights, particularly where some aspect of academic freedom has
been at stake. The import of protecting academic freedom under the can-
opy of the first amendment was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire9 where the Court said:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a de-
mocary that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and univer-
sities would imperil the future of our nation.... Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding, otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.80 (Emphasis added)
Sweezy's continuing validity is illustrated by its favorable citation in the re-
cent cases of Whitehill v. Elkins81 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents.8 2
'While on their facts, Whitehill and Keyishian differ from Sweezy and the
posed case, 83 the applicability of the principles of academic freedom is
more than arguably relevant.
The difference in status between a teacher and student cannot be con-
sidered so vast as to render nugatory the principle discernible from this line
of decisions, namely, that there is established a substantial degree of aca-
demic freedom for students and faculty which is protected from govern-
ment interdiction. Surely one could not successfully seize on the factual
distinction posed in the student editor's case, i.e.: that his status as a student
renders him without the scope of the cited cases. Even though the Supreme
Court has decided no cases specifically concerning student vis-a-vis faculty
academic freedom, the Sweezy Court pointedly, albeit gratuitously, stated
that students as well as teachers must always remain free to inquire, to
study, and to evaluate within the framework of academic freedom prin-
ciples.84
A fair application of the academic freedom principles in Sweezy sup-
78 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365 (1967).
79 354 U.S. 234 (1956).
o Id. at 250.
81389 U.S. 54 (1967).
82 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
83 Whitehill and Keyishian invalidated teacher loyalty oaths and, Sweezy dealt with a state
legislative investigation of a college professor's lectures and political beliefs.
84 Supra note 79 at 250.
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ports the contention that the sanctions sought to be imposed on our student
editor are beyond the outer limits of permissible university regulation."5
Further, a careful examination of the rationale used by our "hypothetical""8
university would impose a "strait jacket" of the kind condemned in Sweezy
not only upon the student editor, but upon all contributors to the newspa-
per. It should not require argument to assert that such a regulation while
not applicable to faculty contributors under Sweezy could become operative
when the contribution to the newspaper is that of a student.
The university in the posed situation has taken the position that since
the state is the owner of the university, adverse commentary directed at the
owner cannot be tolerated. This policy is based primarily on the univer-
sity's desire to maintain its financially favorable position with the governor
and state legislature, fearing that adverse commentary will jeopardize its
ability to obtain future funds.
In the examination of the university's rationale, one should seek to test
its legitimacy by asking and answering the question whether or not the ob-
ject of the policy is such as to justify the operative restriction. The law and
literature of the Supreme Court makes clear that first amendment rights are
not absolute. They are subject to restriction, only however, when the gov-
ernmental purpose is substantial and cannot be achieved through less re-
strictive alternatives. Within the recent past, the Supreme Court has
addressed itself to the issue of first amendment strictures of the type im-
posed when some governmental interest could be shown, and has found
that the establishment of that prerequisite alone does not always meet the
permissible constitutional limits.
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,8 7 the Court, in dealing with a postal
regulation seeking to limit the mailable nature of postal matters of com-
munist origin, held that "[In] the area of First Amendment freedoms, gov-
ernment has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations
which are adequate for the purpose."' Thus it would appear, the legiti-
mate and substantial state interests must not only be shown, but the regu-
lation used to protect those interests must not ". . . broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."8' 0
The application of the principle expressed in Lamont to the analogous
85 See Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (Mass. 1970) where the student editor
was required to submit all material to a faculty advisory board for approval prior to printing.
The court held this was an unconstitutional restraint on the student's freedom of speech and
of the press. Arbitrary restrictions placed upon what may be printed were treated as unen-
forceable. But see, also, Norton v. Discipline Committee of East Tennessee State University,
419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969) in which the dismissal of students for distributing "false and in-
flamatory" literature was held not to have violated their civil rights.
so8d.
87 381 U.S. 305 (1965).
881d. at 310.
89 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).
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issue raised in the case of the student editor calls for an examination of
whether or not the asserted university interest bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the regulation sought to be exercised. Even if the nexus between
the no criticism rule and the financial position of the university within the
state government can be shown to be more than merely speculative, the rule
should not withstand a constitutional assault. Such a basis for censorship
is not even reasonable, much less compelling. To successfully place a stu-
dent editor under such a condition as the no criticism rule would be not too
unlike the exaction from him of a species of loyalty oath; namely, conform-
ity by publishing only laudatory articles of the officials in state power and
of state political activity, the breach of which will result in dismissal from
the university community. There is a striking similarity between the posed
university regulation and one which would require a student editor to pro-
fess a religious faith not his own or to be the mouthpiece of political ortho-
doxy.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by work or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.90
If the no criticism rule could be found to be based on the rationale that
administrative censorship is necessary to achieve high standards of jour-
nalism in the student newspaper, the regulation in question here might,
if exercised reasonably, meet first amendment limitation criteria. This
might also be the case if the rule were bottomed on the premise that the
newspaper should be a forum for the presentation of diverse views or, in
specific circumstances, to insure or achieve order and decorum on the cam-
pus. But in the posed case, none of these qualifiedly acceptable premises
are put forward. The resultant effect can only be viewed as the type which
was condemned by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Burnside
v. Byars"' and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education.2  In
each of those cases students were sought to be disciplined for wearing but-
tons advocating a position on a politically sensitive issue and, in each case,
the court took a position clearly analogous to Lamont while at the same
time recognizing the extension of first amendment principles to students.
The court expressed the rule that:
[School officialsj cannot infringe on their students' right to free and un-
restricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment
... where the exercise of such rights ... do not materially and substan-
90 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
0 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
02 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
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tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the oper-
ation of the school.93
The court in Blackwell cites with favor the Supreme Court's holding in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4 that "[The Four-
teenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects the citizens
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not
excepted."95
The recent case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District"' provides the first Supreme Court decision which faces
squarely the application of the first amendment to such student expres-
sions as were present in Burnside and Blackwell. Tinker involved an ac-
tion for nominal damages and injunctive relief brought on behalf of three
school children. The children were sent home from school for violating
a regulation which sought to forbid the wearing of black arm bands to
school "to mourn those who had died in the Viet Nam War and to support
the late Senator Robert Kennedy's proposal that the truce proposed for
Christmas Day, 1965, be extended indefinitely."'9 7
The district court in Tinker expressly refused to follow Burnside or
Blackwell in holding that the disciplined decorum of the classroom should
take precedence over the plaintiffs' right of speech 8 Following an affirm-
ance by an evenly divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,9 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari'00 and reversed the lower court.10 1
The Court, speaking through Justice Fortas, dearly reaffirmed that,
"First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students."'12  The
wearing of armbands was considered a form of expression closely related
to "pure speech" and therefore constitutionally protected.
In determining whether this form of expression could be prohibited in
the school environment, the Court adopted the Burnside test.
Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in
the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operations of the school'
the prohibition cannot be sustained.'0 3
93 Burnside, supra note 91 at 749.
94 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
951d. at 637.
96 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
97 258 F. Supp. 971,972 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
98258 F. Supp. 971.
99 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
:10 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
101 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
102 Id. at 506.
103Id at 509.
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Lacking a record which showed such a disruptive effect, the Court held in
Tinker that the wearing of armbands could not constitutionally be prohib-
ited. Similarly, the student editor, publishing a well written but critical
editorial, would appear to be engaged in a non-disruptive mode of expres-
sion within the protection of the first amendment.
Admittedly, the problem of fund-raising provides an added factor in
the student editor case. There is no doubt that fund-raising represents an
important interest of a state-supported institution. This writer is not so
naive as to overlook the obvious practicalities involved in obtaining legis-
lative appropriations. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that institu-
tions have a valid interest in encouraging students to respect faculty author-
ity. However, when faculty and administrators exceed their authority and
tread heavily on important first amendment rights to enforce a student's
submission to authority as a means to satisfy the practicalities of fund-rais-
ing, it is they who are placing themselves above duly constituted authority,
not the student.
Finally, one must ask if the no criticism rule really expresses a state in-
terest. The interest detailed above is purposely called that of a "state
interest" because that label accurately characterizes the extant condition.
The interest of the university in obtaining legislative appropriations is pure-
ly an institutional one; it is the power to provide the funds and thus satisfy
their interest which rests in the state. Consequently, it cannot be said that
the overriding "state" interest is to obtain funds for one of its institutions.
More accurately portrayed, the state's interest here is to use its control of
funds as a lever to regulate critical comments on state government. It
would appear patently absured to allow a university to convert its admit-
tedly substantial and legitimate institutional interest into a similar state
interest where the state itself can satisfy the institutional needs. To view it
otherwise would permit a state government to coerce university authorities
into an unconstitutional exercise of power which the state dearly could not
directly do itself.
A central purpose of the first amendment is to prevent the use of gov-
ernment power to coerce political or religious conformity whether it be
through the compulsory nature of the type condemned in Barnette or tfie
"chilling"'1 4 type of negative compulsion which acts to silence first amend-
ment expressions. A university regulation limiting a student editor to laud-
atory comments only when writing about state political activities can only
be said to impose the latter type of impermissible stricture of first amend-
ment expresson.
The value of student publications on university campuses has been rec-
104 See generally, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 308 U.S. 479 (1965); Wolff v. Selective Service
Local Board No. 16,372 F.2d 817 (2nd Cir. 1965).
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ognized by the U. S. National Student Association and endorsed by the
Council of the American Association of University Professors thusly:
Student publications and the student press are a valuable aid in establish-
ing and maintaining an atmosphere of free and responsible discussion and
of intellectual exploration on the campus. They are a means of bringing
student concerns to the attention of the faculty and the institutional au-
thorities and of formulating student opinion on various issues on the cam-
pus and in the world at large. 05
The American Civil Liberties Union in speaking to the same matter has
taken a position similar to the NSA and AAUP by saying:
S.. [T]he college administration which takes no steps to control the con-
tent of a student publication, and refrains, in a controversial situation
from suspending or . . . penalizing one or more student editors, testifies
to its belief in the principles of academic freedom and freedom of the
press. 108
The campus newspaper editor should be viewed in the same first
amendment light as a political science or law professor. He, as much as
they, is appointed to use the institution's facilities to discuss current issues;
they in the classroom and he in the newspaper. The very purpose of hav-
ing a newspaper on a campus is to allow superior journalism students to
communicate with the academic community concerning events of current
interest. To put the student editor in the position of knowing that there
is incumbent upon him a vague proscription concerning the publication of
"adverse" comments on state political activity can only act to, potentially
at least, frustrate first amendment expression. This is not to say that a
more definitive and narrowly drawn proscription of a similar sort would
pass constitutional muster, surely it would not. In either case ". . . [T]he
threat of sanctions may deter . . . as potently as the actual application of
sanctions . . .",7 The chilling effect on the editor's writing activities are
no less onerous than the "chilling" effect found constitutionally defective
in Dombrowski v. Pfister.08 In the posed case, free expression, which is a
transcendent value to all society, might be the ultimate loser.109
In today's constitutional jurisprudence, it is dear that a state may not
operate a public school or park outside of requirements imposed by the
fourteenth amendment. It follows that a state cannot exempt its univer-
sities from the first amendment, particularly where academic discussion is
concerned. This should be true even though the state asserts a claim of
"ownership" of the campus newspaper. Although the state may be said to
105 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedom, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365, 367 (1967).
10 American Civil Liberties Union Statement on the Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties
of Students, 6 (1965).
107 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
108 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
109 Id. at 486.
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"own" the university in a technical sense, it does not seem to have the type
of proprietary interest which would permit the imposition of first amend-
ment abridging regulations. Logic impells the view that state "ownership"
is as much a manifestation of state action as is an act of the legislature.
The student editor should be viewed as a citizen who is protected if his
views expressed in his editorial columns suggest that government and po-
litical officials are not infallible. The recent majority view of Mills v. Ala-
bama"0° is clearly analogous to this proffered position:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amend-
ment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.
This of course includes... the manner in which government is operated,
and all such matters relating to political processes ... Supression of the
right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor
and contend for or against change ... muzzles one of the very agencies
the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected
to improve our society and keep it free."' (Emphasis added).
Mills involved a state criminal statute punishing any newspaper editor
who published an editorial on election day endorsing a candidate for office.
Although Mills concerned a private newspaper, the state, in the case of our
student editor, surely can show no greater interest in supressing critical dis-
cussions in a student newspaper. Indeed, the state's interest should more
logically be focused on improving government administration and stimulat-
ing the academic environment of its universities. The ideal of New York
Times v. Sullivan"2 should be a constant thread through the fabric of a
state's concept of its institutions of higher learning. That view should be
based on the premise: "... that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials."111
Cases like Tinker, Blackwell and Burnside, discussed above, indicate
that the complex and sensitive area of university discipline will be the sub-
ject of judicial scrutiny in its substantive effects as well as the procedural
standard made extant through the Dixon and Knight decisions also dis-
cussed above.
Recently, Hammond v. South Carolina State College" 4 presented a dis-
ciplinary case based on the failure of the students involved in a mass dem-
onstration to obtain advance permission. The rule requiring such advance
permission was clearly stated in the Student Handbook." 5 The procedures
110 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
Ill Id. at 218-19.
112 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11a Id. at 270.
114 272 F. Supp. 947 (S.C. 1967).
115 The regulation in pertinent part reads: "The student body or any part of the student body
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
which followed this violation of the university rule cannot be condemned
as violative of due process. In fact, a rehearing was had by the students
after the initial one resulted in their suspension. Therefore, the only issue
to be addressed in Hammond was whether or not the university rule,
through its prospective and actual application, fell afoul of the students'
first amendment rights.
The basis of the rule in Hammond was expressed by the school's Board
of Trustees in passing a resolution which stated "... . in the avowed interest
of protecting the students of this institution from violence and to preserve
public peace and order ... Be it resolved that hereafter any student...
who shall engage in any public demonstrations without prior approval...
shall be summarily expelled.""" (Emphasis added.)
The court recognized that the purpose of the rule was to keep order on
the campus and prevent chaos. Surely one cannot doubt that the preserva-
tion of a peaceful academic atmosphere is an integral part of an institu-
tion's function and, that without the power to insist on a standard of
deportment, the administrative authorities cannot guarantee the carrying on
of the business of education.
The court in Hammond, while not citing Burnside, extended the Burn-
side's doctrine of material and substantial interference in the school's op-
eration to one more closely resembling Supreme Court pronouncements in
demonstration cases. The court in applying the same standards to students
as are generally applicable to those not on the campus said: "These rights
of the First Amendment, including the right to peaceably assemble, are not
to be restricted except upon the showing of a clear and present danger, of
riot, disorder, or immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.
'
""11
The relevance of Hammond to the case of the student editor is clear.
Now not only must the university show that the adverse comments on state
political activity contained in the newspaper might materially and substan-
tially interfere with the school's operation, but there must also be met the
higher standard of showing a dear and present danger." 8 Without this
showing, the principles of academic freedom and the first amendment take
precedence over whatever other interest the university may have.
is not to celebrate, parade, or demonstrate on the campus at any time without the approval of
the Office of the President." South Carolina State College Student Handbook, Rule 4(1), p. 49.
116 Cited in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, supra note 114 at 949. See also,
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968) which upheld a college rule requiring 48 hours
advance notice prior to any mass demonstration. In finding no restraint on protected freedoms,
the court distinguished Hammond, stating that the regulation in Powe only required notice be
given and not that approval be obtained.
117 Supra note 114 at 950.
I' See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Compare, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966) where the nature of the right of assembly and demonstration became subject to a special
limitation, that being, the nature of the place which is the object of the demonstration; and,
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) as to the nature of state property in general as
a place for demonstration.
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The argument is that since the student editor took his position knowing
in advance the university's editorial control policy, and that since appoint-
ment to his position is a privilege conferred by the university, no first amend-
ment right can be said to have been violated. What such a position as-
sumes is that in order to obtain the grant of the privilege conferring the
editor's post on him, the student relinquishes his claim on certain first
amendment rights.
This idea was examined above in regard to the privilege/right dichot-
omy of attendance at a university. There, it will be recalled, it was shown
that a university cannot condition attendance upon the waiver of the right
to be free from administrative action lacking in procedural due process re-
quirements. The denunciation of this unconstitutional condition theory
has not been limited to procedural due process. Its full force and meaning
have equal force in instances in which first amendment claims arise. It is
no more constitutionally permissible to condition the grant of a benefit on
the exchange waiver of a substantive right then it is to do so regarding
procedural due process.
The leading case in applying the unconstitutional condition prohibition
to first amendment questions is Speiser v. Randall."1 Before Speiser, the
examination of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine came primarily
from employment loyalty oath cases. 120 Speiser, however, dealt with a pre-
labeled exercise in "legislative grace" in which the California legislature
provided for a tax exemption "privilege" for all veterans who executed a
loyalty oath. There the normatively ambiguous term of privilege was ap-
parently not open to conclusionary characterization. The legislature had
made it dear that their largesse extended only to those who met the statu-
tory criteria. The state asserted logically that an exemption from an other-
wise statutory duty could not cause a constitutional infringement to one not
exempt. The Court, in rejecting the state's position, held that the exemp-
tion statute sought to stifle the first amendment exercise of free speech
through the incentive of tax relief, and in so doing was a suppression of
first amendment rights without any concomitant compelling state interest
to ". . . justify the short cut procedure. . . ." 1' The Court made it dear
that a condition imposed upon the grant of a privilege must be reasonable.
Just as there was no obligation to provide the tax relief at issue in
Speiser, there is no constitutional compulsion for a state to provide univer-
sities and colleges. However, in electing to provide such beneficial insti-
tutions, it is well settled that the state is not free to do so in a manner
which abridges constitutionally protected rights. Brown v. Board of Educa-
110 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
120 E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra note 25;
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
121 Speiser, supra note 54 at 529.
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tion'-2 proved that this doctrine is viable in the primary function of educa-
tion. Recent cases of various origin provide a basis for asserting that the
unconstitutional condition doctrine is applicable also in the educationally
ancillary matters." Such a case dealing with these ancillary matters, and
analogous to the student in his exercise of first amendment rights, is Dan-
skin v. San Diego Unified School District.124 There, the local civil liberties
union applied to use a public school for a meeting on the Bill of Rights.
The group refused to sign a broad loyalty oath as a condition of their using
the facility. The California Supreme Court, in a landmark opinion, held
that the school had no duty to allow use of its facilities, but that when it
did, it could not condition their use on criteria which inhibited the exercise
of first amendment rights. Justice Traynor for the court said: "A state is
without the power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition
for granting a privilege even though the privilege is the use of state prop-
erty.' 25
The theory adopted by Justice Traynor and the court in Danskin finds
acceptance today by leading state courts regarding the use of school facil-
ities vis-a-vis first amendment exercise questions.1' Most recently, the
New York Court of Appeals applied the Danskin theory in a case where
school officials withdrew their authorization for the use of school facilities
when they decided that folk singer Peter Seeger was too "controversial."
The court granted an injunction against further discrimination by the
school officials.'27
The result for the student of the demise of the unconstitutional condi-
tion doctrine should be a recognition that a state is prohibited from grant-
ing a benefit to him only in exchange for his relinquishing what would be
a constitutional right if the student had obtained the benefit without gov-
ernment cooperation. More specifically, the college editor in the posed
situation would be lifted from his dilemma. If the conditioning of the
benefit were viable, the editor would not be subject to sanction because he
chose to write about state politics, but only because he did so in a critical
way. He could fill his columns with comments praising state government,
122 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123 gan v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3rd Dep't. 1963), a/i'd. mem.,
14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.B.2d 842, 250 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964) (State university cannot exclude in-
vited lecturer from presenting discussion on politics where invitee was a member of the Com-
munist Party); Ellis v. Allen, 4 App. Div. 2d 343, 165 N.Y.S.2d 624 (3rd Dep't. 1957)
(School board cannot exclude peace organization from use of its buildings as long as it allows
other groups their use); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(Hunter College cannot exclude conservative editor from using auditorium for political forum).
124 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
125 Id. at 892.
126 See cases cited in footnote 123 supra.
127East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219
NXE.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966), re-aff'd per curiam alter remand, 19 N.Y.2d 605, 224
N.E.2d 888, 278 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967).
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but if he changed his evaluation he would be forced to write on a different
subject. To deny the applicability of the first amendment to the student
editor would be tantamount to subsidizing those who conform politically
and penalizing those who do not.
Sherbert v. Verner 28 involved an analogous situation which illustrates
the wide scope of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in dealing with
first amendment issues. Plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist, was discharged
from her employment because she conscientiously refused to work on Sat-
urday, her religious day of rest. The South Carolina Employment Security
Commission refused to pay her unemployment compensation insurance be-
cause she would not work on her Sabbath. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed and emphasized an important point which is relevant to the case
of the student editor. In writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan ad-
hered to the Court's earlier view as expressed in Speiser, that benefits could
not be conditioned with indirect burdens on first amendment rights. In
finding that the state's claim that Mrs. Verner could hold and express her
beliefs at any time except the Saturday working hours, Mr. Justice Brennan
said: "[I]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon
a benefit or privilege."'2 9  (Emphasis added).
The concerted effect of Dixon, denying the contention that a college
student has accepted admission on the condition of waiver of his due proc-
ess rights, and of Speiser, Danskin and Sherbert, denying the power of the
state to condition a grant only by allowing an infringement on a first
amendment right, should be persuasive in the posed student newspaper
case. The effect should be dear that, "[A] state cannot force a college
student to forfeit his constitutionally protected right of freedom of expres-
sion as a condition to his attending a state supported institution."' 30 "It is
inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence."' 3'1
If the foregoing is persuasive in advancing the theory that the univer-
sity may not take punative action against the student writer, the question
remains as to the power vel non of the university to remove the student
editor from his position. Here the answer is surely less dear. As a student
merely chosen to serve in his position, is the student editor in the relation-
ship of employee to the university who is in reality the publisher/owner
of the newspaper? It would seem that the character of the objection form-
ing the reason for the attempted removal presents the most reasonable path
to analysis. If the attempted removal was based on an academically in-
spired journalistic objection to the quality of the editor's columns, then one
128374 U.S. 298 (1963).
129 Id. at 404.
130 Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
131 Frost & Frost Co. v. R. IL Commissioner, 271 U.S. 583,594 (1926).
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could easily justify a removal. However, to have the editor's tenure in
office based solely on his acquiesence to forego printing editorials critical
of state government places the attempted removal in an altogether different
light. Whether the editor's interest is here characterized as a "right" or
a "privilege" is not decisive because the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions forbids the government use of the "privilege" characterization to
achieve objectives which abridge first amendment interests unless the uni-
versity can show a compelling or overriding and presumably independent
justification.
Under the theory of Dixon, it can logically be asserted that the interests
of the student editor in retaining his position have reached the stage where
they cannot be dealt with in the conclusionary terms of right or privilege,
but rather they must "... be evaluated.., in terms of their true significance
and worth."1'8 2  A journalism student's interest in being a student news-
paper editor is as potentially valuable as a law student's interest in becom-
ing a member of the law review. Participation in either form of writing
program may enable the student to develop improved writing skills, greater
understanding of the role of publications in his chosen profession, and in-
creased marketability of his personal abilities upon graduation. This
would seem to be a sufficiently important interest to justify applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the posed contingency.
Speech Plus
While the discussion of the student editor situation is generally demon-
strative of the outer limits of permissible regulations, an examination
should also be made of other general types of first amendment exercises
on campus and their attempted regulation. The above discussions should
at least have served to dispel the notion that students are dependent per-
sons subject to only such rights, in areas usually thought of as within the
ambit of constitutional protections, as the institutional authorities thought
fit to grant them.
The parallel constitutional liberties of speech and assembly which are
a necessary part of the academic freedom of students dearly enunciated
by the Dixon and Burnside courts are basic conditions of scholarship, and
therefore, basic conditions of any educational enterprise. The constitution-
ally underscored academic freedom of students cannot be limited to listening
in the classroom to professors describing political and social theories.
Neither can the mere reading of expressions of thought be said to satisfy
the criteria of student academic freedom. The university is generally con-
sidered to be the training ground for independent thinking by giving stu-
dents occasion for thought and opportunities for expression of thought.
In this regard, the whole campus, and not just the classroom, must provide
132 Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra note 1 at 178.
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the appropriate conditions to stimulate and encourage thought. Indeed,
the classroom is heavily under the teacher's authority, both as an institu-
tional representative and as an established scholar, so that independence of
thought if it is to be operative, is to be pursued as much outside the class-
room as in it. Therefore, restrictions on expressional exercises by students
on campus should be viewed as unacceptable restraints on first amendment
interests except as they are necessitated by the protection of institutional
activities from disturbance.13 3  Even this protection from disturbance
should, under the Hammond rationale, be measured by the minimum re-
quirements of safety, traffic, and the protection of property from misuse.
Not only should the university have the burden to demonstrate in what
manner a given rule is necessary to preserve its functions, it should also
demonstrate that the functions it assumes and seeks to protect by that rule
are themselves constitutionally legitimate. If a recognized and legitimate
function of a university is to prepare the student for life in a democratic
society, it should appear indefensible to allow the university to incorporate
within that function a method constitutionally withdrawn from the state.
The university may not promulgate and constitutionally enforce a rule re-
quiring daily chapel attendance or contribution to a religious order through
tuition. It seems patently dear that a rule forbidding students from engag-
ing in first amendment exercises would be likewise impermissible. The
attempt to prevent this type of activity, even though allegedly justified un-
der some presumed legitimate function such as "inculcating in the student
body a sense of good citizenship," should be recognized as an attempt to
enforce political orthodoxy. Viewed in that light, the regulation could
only be found to be a transgression on constitutional principles.
This is not to say that the university is totally impotent in regulating
such activity as picketing on the campus. It may rule against such conduct
within the same limitations placed on any governmental community in anal-
ogous circumstances. It may rule against such conduct only to the extent
that some particular activity disrupts or detracts from its legitimate busi-
ness. In this regard, a regulation can find constitutional justification only
by being applied against the disruptive abuse, not the first amendment
rights themselves.'2 4
Similar to Cox v. Louisiana,"5 a university regulation such as described
133 Recent decisions firmly hold that students participating in certain non-peaceful and
disruptive activities, even though the conduct involves some degree of first amendment expres-
sion, are not constitutionally protected from disciplinary action. See e.g., Barker v. Hardway,
283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968) (disruptive conduct during a football game); Jones v.
State Board of Education of and For the State of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn.
1968) (disruption of a university meeting); Butmey v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (Colo., 1968)
(physically blocking lawful access to college buildings); and Scott v. Alabama State Board of
Education, 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (unauthorized seizure and occupation of a col-
lege facility).
134 See, De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 64 at 364.
135 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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above can be reasonable and enforceable even though intertwined with first
amendment exercises. If students were to noisily picket under classroom
windows or demonstrate by parading through the library, it is plain that
legitimate functions of the university would be impeded.
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our
democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or be-
liefs to express may address a group at any public place at any time. The
constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized
society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost
in the excesses of anarchy.136
The cited authority recognizes that picketing involves elements of both
speech and conduct in the form of patrolling. It is thus recognized that
this intermingling of protected and unprotected activities subjects student
picketing to controls that would not be constitutionally permissible in the
case of pure speech.' 3 7
It is likewise clear that the university cannot assert an interest of private
property over the campus in order to prevent picketing activity.13  The
same would be true if the student activity engaged in was pampheteering
or handbilling since the constitutional question involved is solely one of
right of access for the expression of views. Moreover, the mere title to
municipal property standing alone is insufficient to serve as a basis for pro-
scribing first amendment speech related activities without a further con-
sideration of the normal manner in which the property is used.139
Universities, as well as streets and parks, have traditionally served the
needs of public discussion. The posed event of student picketing on the
university campus is surely no less of an exercise of "basic constitutional
rights in their most pristine and classic form"'140 than an expression of
views in a like manner in front of the state capitol building. Further, the
state university is generally viewed as a public place and thus, absent other
factors involving the purpose'4 ' or manner of the picketing, the activity of
peaceful student picketing is protected by the first amendment.'4
1361d. at 554.
137 See e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1964); Interna-
tional Bd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
'
3 8 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
139 Edwards v. South Carolina, supra note 118.
140 Id. at 235.
.41 If picketing is found to be aimed at or involved with an illegal end such as certain
coercion or boycotting proscribed by the various labor acts, it falls outside of the scope of first
amendment protection. Picketing aimed at such illegal ends will not be herein considered
or discussed.
142Teamsters Local 795 v. Newell 356 U.S. 341 (1958); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); compare, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) where the nature and usual use of
the place picketed negatived the concept that state property is normally open to the public.
Hence if access can be denied, the situs takes on an aura of quasi-privateness which renders
valid proscriptions on even peaceful picketing.
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A possible attempted justification for the prohibition of student picket-
ing is likely to be based on a nuisance factor. For example, the alleged
nuisance resulting from the litter spread across the picket situs is an ap-
pealing rationale. However, suppressing of an expressional exercise under
the guise of prohibiting conduct susceptable to regulation will not wash.
In Schneider v. State,143 the Court had before it just such a regulation which
purported to keep the streets clean and litter free by prohibiting the dis-
tribution of handbills. In striking down the regulation, the Court said "the
purpose to keep streets dean and of good appearance is insufficient to jus-
tify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from
[engaging in expressional exercises."'144
Thus, it can be forcefully asserted that while reasonable regulations af-
fecting the time, place, and manner of student picketing are permissible if
the university bears the burden of demonstrating their necessary reason-
ableness,145 nevertheless, a broad prohibition or overly restrictive university
regulation in this regard is constitutionally defective.
University rules which are a legitimate exercise of reasonable regulation
are perforce aimed at the necessity for order to enable it to get on with its
lawful business and to enable others to take advantage of whatever the uni-
versity provides. What would appear the apparent target of such a univer-
sity regulation is the activity's "action" vis-a-vis its "expression."'146 Using
these classifications, the university can successfully assert that regulation
and suppression are not the same. 47 Within this theoreical framework,
those forms of conduct classified as expression are entitled to complete pro-
tection against university infringement. The example of the student editor
discussed above should logically be placed in the expression category, and
therefore, the complete immunity asserted should apply. However, note
the dear distinction to be found in Hammond. There the group expres-
sion was transformed into action in the nature of a demonstration. No
longer could complete immunity under first amendment principles be un-
alterably applied in Hammond. It was not a question ultimately of free-
dom of speech or assembly, but rather a question of facts and proof of
conduct withdrawing first amendment protection. When the conduct in
Hammond moved from the harmless expression category to a form of ac-
tion, the cloak of reasonable regulation fell over it. Because first amend-
ment rights are involved in both instances, it does not follow that one and
143 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
144 Id. at 162.
14, See, Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968), which held that a college rule, re-
quiring that for mass demonstrations advance notice be given, was reasonable in light of the
administration's need to prepare for any exigency.
140 See generally, Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1, esp. 21 et seq. (1964); see also. T. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963).
147 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1952).
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not the other may not be regulated. The Supreme Court has consistently
found reasonable non-discriminatory regulations that bear a definitive
nexus to peace and order and design to achieve a legitimate social objective
are not offensive to first amendment principles.148
How, If at All, Is Off-Campus Activity Susceptable to Regulation?
The above discussion, while limited to on-campus activities, raises the
necessity for examining the university's role, if any, when the same or sim-
ilar activities are engaged in by students off the campus. If the activity is
one which is constitutionally protected when engaged in by non-student
citizens and is therefore protected against university infringement when
engaged in by students on the campus, it follows that the sanctioning power
is likewise removed from the university when the student chooses to en-
gage in the same exercise off the campus. It would be dearly inconsistent,
if not absurd, to permit a university to sanction a student for engaging in,
for example, a peaceful demonstration downtown and be restrained from
the same sanctioning process if the demonstration had been aimed at the
university administration. The "chilling" effect of Dombrowski would be no
less present if a student were forced to forgo political expression or lawful
action off-campus upon pain of jeopardizing his status as a student. The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions once again would become operative
in finding as unacceptable the premise that a student's status is conditioned
upon his absention from lawful means of protected advocacy and expres-
sion.
The logical thrust of this negative implication is that it leaves the public
university free to proceed against a student for any conduct not under the
shield of constitutional protection that otherwise is subject to general re-
strictions by a valid state law. A university rule which threatens to sanc-
tion a student who violates a valid law does not appear to state a condition
which operates to infringe upon any constitutionally protected right. Such
a rule would not seem to come within the ambit of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as it was employed above. For example, one has no
constitutional right to be drunk and disorderly in a public place. Thus a
person in that circumstance cannot successfully claim that any constitutional
immunity is jeopardized by the law which makes such conduct a crime.
Similarly, a university rule which operates to sanction a student who drives
drunkenly cannot be said to interfere with a substantive constitutional
right. Viewed in this context, the university rule rings akin to the familiar
148 E.g., Adderley v. Florida, supra note 118; Cox v. Louisiana, note 118; Edwards v. South
Carolina, supra note 118; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, supra note 147, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Lovell v. Griffin, supra note 138.
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constitutional rubric that "one may not have a constitutional right to go to
Bagdad."' 40
Application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to this circum-
stance could not be logically asserted. If one accepts the premise that
initial attendance at a state university is not per se a constitutionally under-
scored right, and that the prerogative to drive drunkenly is likewise not a
protected right, then conditioning the first upon abstaining from the other
consequently is not objectionable in terms of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as discussed earlier. Thus, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions does not per se restrain a public university from promulgating a regu-
lation that any student who violates a valid state, federal, or local law shall
be sanctioned.
Just such a university rule was tested and found not objectionable in
Due v. Florida A. & M. University.'5 In this case, the student was adjudged
in contempt of court and was subsequently dismissed from the university
on the authority of a regulation which in pertinent part read:
Disciplinary action will be taken against students for: .... Misconduct
while on or off the campus. This includes students who may be convicted
by . .. city, county or federal [authorities] for violation of any of the
criminal and/or civil laws.' 51
Counsel and the court in Due placed emphasis on the operative facts
of the case as they related to the plaintiff's claim of lack of procedural due
process. However, implicit in the court's opinion is the theory that since
no constitutionally protected substantive interest of the plaintiff could be
found through his engaging in contemptuous conduct, the university's clas-
sification of that activity as miscondut should not be examined.152
The objectionable "chilling" effect found in Dombrowski is likewise
absent from the effect of a regulation operating against a student for viola-
tions of law. The potential pain of university sanction heaped atop the
statutory punishment for law violations would seem to have only a bene-
ficial "chilling" effect. It should serve as an added deterrent to obtain ob-
servance of legal requirements or proscriptions since the regulation chills
only unprotected and unlawful activity.
The dilemma which would severely test the university rule threatening
potential action against a student when a law has been violated arises where
the violation itself contains a colorable claim of constitutional protection.
149Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Of course, the necessary prereq-
uisite of the operative rule would require that the second phrase of that same rubric be ob-
served; "but the government may not prohibit one from going there unless by means consonant
with due process of law."
150 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
is, Id. at 399.
152 Note: The writer has specifically discussed the Due case with the judge who heard it,
The Honorable Harold Carswell, and was assured that had the case involved a federally pro-
tected interest, a totally different result might have emerged.
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For instance, it would not be unlikely to find students engaging in enjoined
activity which otherwise would be a protected mode of first amendment
exercise-for example, enjoined civil rights marching. The question
must necessarily arise: which takes precedence, the exercise of what would
normally be a protected right, or the observance of the prohibition relating
thereto? It we apply the reasoning just discussed, it should be more logical
to assert that a valid legal proscription, the injunction, was violated there-
fore the doctrines of Dombrowski or unconstitutional conditions do not
arise. On the other hand, if the constitutionally protected exercise is ac-
cepted as a preferred value, or if the basis of the injunction is subsequently
found constitutionally unacceptable, then the university would appear pow-
erless to invoke its sanctioning process in this circumstance.
By analogy to the rationale of Walker v. City of Birmingham,15 the
former rather than the latter view would seem to be the present constitu-
tional approach. In Walker, an undenied first amendment exercise was
temporarily enjoined pending further litigation to test a statutory restriction
thereon as to its constitutionality. In violating the injunction, petitioners
affronted the court and found themselves in contempt thereof. In asserting
the invalidity of the ordinance which served as the basis for the injunction's
issuance, the petitioners claimed that affirmance of their contempt convic-
tion would be tantamount to an impermissible infringement on their first
amendment rights. In affirming the convictions, the Court said that not-
withstanding the potential viability of the constitutional claims, one who
deliberately violates a court order may properly be convicted of contempt.
Tranposed to the student/university setting, an analogous situation
should allow the university to exercise its sanctioning process in a like man-
ner. Even though a student may be engaging in an otherwise protected
activity, except for an extant injunction, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine or the "chilling" rationale of Dombrowski might apply. The uni-
versity should nonetheless be able to assert the rule that conviction under a
valid law should grant it the power to impose sanctions. This is reason-
able because it is not the protected exercise that is subject to punishment,
but the disregard of a court order having the force, temporarily at least, of
law.
Granting that neither the unconstitutional conditions nor Dombrowski
theories per se prevent the university from invoking its sanctioning process
for law violations, there remains in legal contemplation the limitation
on arbitrary actions under the idea of substantive due process. In the con-
text of this paper, the arbitrary limitation concept should be thought of as
a functional classification viewing the comparative arbitrariness of a given
sanctioning rule.
Thus examined, the rule under scrutiny will not be found to have any
153 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
[Vol. 31
FIRST AMENDMENT
rational connection to a legitimate university purpose and therefore effect-
ing a denial of substantive due process in the sense of being absolutely ar-
bitrary. Rather, the rule, if found to deny substantive due process, must
be so because its effects are harsh and inessential to achieve a legitimate
purpose. In determining whether or not the application of a university
rule seeking to punish off-campus law violations runs afoul of that doctrine,
one should ask the following question: How substantial is the nexus be-
tween the rule in question and the legitimate purpose it is meant to serve?
The Danskin case cited earlier in another context serves well to illus-
trate this theory also. It will be recalled that the school district had as its
purpose in requiring users of its facilities to sign a broadly stated loyalty
oath the prevention of subversive or seditious conduct arising therefrom.
Inter alia, the court viewed such a requirement as violative of substantive
due process because the state had sought to achieve a legitimate end, the
prevention of subversive conduct, by a means which was inessential thereto
and comparatively harsh in its application. There were clearly other and
more effective alternatives which the state could adopt to achieve the stated
objective. For example, the state could adopt specific criminal statutes to
prevent the feared subversive activity. The regulation was not void because
it had absolutely no rational connection with the desired end, but because
that nexus was too tenuous and too harsh when applied.
It is within this expanded idea of substantive due process that we
should determine whether or not a university rule seeking to sanction a stu-
dent for law violations can withstand assault. The omnibus rule found in
Due purporting to empower the university to the disciplinary action
against a student for violation of any law should, in the proper case, raise
the spectre of constitutional infringement. For instance, the attempt to in-
yoke such a rule against a student who is a notorious jaywalker or one who
is convicted of fighting at a local football game would seem lacking in jus-
tification. The nexus between the university's purpose and the act engaged
in by the student seems too specious to support sanction. However, the
asserted rationale for the attempt to impose the sanction would probably
follow the questionable theory that the university owes to the community
at large a duty to act for the benefit of the general welfare. This belief
may be held either because the community helps to finance the school,
whether public or private, or because the university is dedicated to the pur-
pose of acting as a public servant. Accordingly, as we have seen in Due,
the university feels obliged to impose disciplinary sanctions where the stu-
dent has engaged in off-campus conduct violative of the community's
mores.
The errors in this rationale are two-fold. First, if the university owes
a duty to the community, the nature of that duty is for the school to func-
tion as a university, not as a police court. Therefore, in order to justify its
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disciplinary action on the grounds that it is fulfilling an institutional duty
to the community, the university should be required to demonstrate that its
attempted exercise constitutes conduct necessary to the educational process.
Second, the power to invoke punishment in our society resides exclu-
sively with the state. For the university to thrust itself into the role of the
state is to subvert, not aid, the public welfare.
In the overview then, it is fair to assert that the relative injury to the
student's interest in retaining his association with the university would seem
to dearly outweigh any injury claimed by the university itself. In this re-
gard it cannot be disputed that disciplinary action taken by a university
against a student carries with it the great possibility of subsequent conse-
quences far in excess of the actual gravamen of the violation. A profes-
sional or graduate school will look with great apprehension at an applicant
whose record reflects a disciplinary action based on a violation of law which
itself may not even be a matter of record. Moreover, the federal govern-
ment and the armed forces are loath to grant to a person with previous
disciplinary trouble any type of meaningful security clearance or access to
a sensitive job position.'54 The possible resultant economic deprivations
or denial of economic opportunity caused by the university sanctioning
process should be clear enough to require that the university prove its vital
interests in any given case.' 55  Moreover, in proving its interest, the uni-
versity rule must be shown to be "necessary and not merely rationally re-
lated to the accomplishment of a permissible [universityl interest."''55
The convenience of such a rule as found in Due should not be seriously
contended as a counter-weight to the substantial interest of the student in
his future economic potential and life-time earning power vis-a-vis his non-
graduated contemporary. 157  The exercise of power by a university under
these circumstances appears to dearly meet the Danskin rationale of harsh-
ness and inessentiality, since such action carries with it an indelible stigma
which cannot but have serious consequences on the student.
By weighing the relative interests of a rule such as found in Due along
with the interests of the university as contrasted against the student's inter-
est in the posed circumstance, it is dear that the rule should be viewed as
a clumsy and oblique device having little relation to the university's pur-
pose. The jaywalking or fighting student is subject to the applicable state
or local law which envisions its violation and establishes the punishment
154 E.g., Defense Dept. form 398 which is a multi-page government form every applicant
for a security clearance must complete has a space provided for just such university disciplinary
actions.
15 5 See generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
156 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
157 According to one study the difference in life-time earning capacity may be as great as
$125,000. 1965 Statistical Abstract of the U.S., p. 122. See also, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), where the Court observed that it is doubtful whether one "may
reasonably expect to succeed in life if he is denied [an] education."
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therefor. The university can show a vital interest in these events sufficient
enough to allow disciplinary action only by the most obtuse and tortured
logic. Therefore, it is submitted that an attempted application of the Due
rationale in most instances should be found constitutionally defective be-
cause it is comparatively so arbitrary that it can be viewed as a denial
of substantive due process. Thus, the student should be considered as pos-
sessed of the personal freedom necessary for his self-education. In this
way, the institution would be able to concentrate its limited resources on
its central tasks. The ordinary police and judicial processes of the com-
munity would be sufficient to protect society against the misdeeds of stu-
dents just as it does in the case of non-students.
The case of the female student given above is demonstrative of the
limbo extant within the theories thus far discussed. Presumably the maga-
zine for which she posed is not considered by the authorities to be ob-
scene.1' The sole basis for the attempted imposition of punishment by
the university is that the student has engaged in "conduct unbecoming a
lady." Thus is raised the question: Can the university impose sanctions for
this type of non-academic and off-campus activity which violates no law?
Assuming briefly that the student's activity is not within the scope of
protected exercises, such a regulation imposed by the university restricting
non-academic and off-campus behavior must be aimed at conduct identified
by society as well as the university community as contrary to public welfare.
When such behavior occurs, the university may feel the need to express dis-
approbation because of the assumed destructive nature of such acts on the
internal decorum and morals of the campus. Such an assumption is not
unusual;r 9 the inclusion of morality among the proper concerns of the state
is firmly rooted in our history. If the conduct of the female student in this
situation can be accepted as contrary to the public welfare, then any coun-
tervailing university interest, however slight, should be sufficient to render
reasonable the regulation of her behavior through threat of sanctions.
However, defining the normative amiguity out of the term "public wel-
fare" is a monumental if not insurmountable task and therefore some other
criteria should be established by which the university's policy can be meas-
ured. In this analysis, it would seem valid to determine the potential det-
rimental effect on the wider public goal of freedom of lawful action as
contrasted with the reasonableness of the regulation in obtaining the stated
limited goal.
15s8 Obscenity such as the type briefly engaged in by the so-called Free Speech Movement
at Berkeley presents a different question. A fair paraphrase of the Roth test would be to say
that "obscene words used for their own sake to shock the viewer are not speech and are not
protected by the first amendment." If the expression is outside of the scope of protection of the
first amendment then there would seem to be no legal doctrine to justify restraining the uni-
versity from sanctioning a student engaged in such "shock obscenity." See, L. Feuer, Porno-
politics and the University, The New Leader 14, April 12, 1965.
159 See e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-47 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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A university classifying as immoral that which is not otherwise illegal,
appears to this writer to be an exercise in illegitimate paternalism which
tends to induce immaturity, conformity, and disinterest. The inducement
of these traits in university students occurs at the precise time when imag-
ination, critical talent, and growth should be encouraged and given the
opportunity for development. The insistence upon the power to discipline
students for non-academic and off-campus activity, felt by the university to
damage its reputation with the local community or alumni, lacks the rea-
sonable or even a tenuous nexus to the intellectual and social discipline
acknowledged to be necessary to maintain classroom order. Dean Hutchins
addressed this unsatisfactory theory of university regulation by saying
".... The university gets involved in trying to chaperone its students and
soon finds that it's spending money and, what's more important, diverting
its attention from the job [of education]."' °
Viewed in the context of the relative values and objectives sought by
the university and its students, a regulation seeking to impose sanctions on
non-academic and off-campus activity is actually an impediment to the ma-
jor function of the institution. It is within the light of the function of a
university that the relationship between the institution and its students must
be considered. The primary function of the university should be to trans-
mit to the student the civilization of the past, to enable him to take part in
the civilization of the present, and to make the civilization of the future 01
It is because of this great pursuit that the student must be viewed as an in-
dividual who is most likely to attain maturity if left free to exercise the
rights as well as shouldering the responsibility of citizenship on and off
the campus.
But in the more traditional sense, who can say that a non-obscene pic-
ture in a magazine is any less a form of expression than Van Gogh's Sun-
flowers? The metaphysical nature of obscenity is beyond the scope of this
paper, so suffice to say that a well articulated definition of obscenity is not
yet part of our jurisprudence. Therefore, the use or the threatened use of
sanction as a deterrent to female students in a circumstance such as raised
above would seem a clear infringement on a protected exercise. It should
not be logically asserted that the female model's mode of expression is any
less constitutionally underscored than the female student who writes a let-
ter to the editor of a local paper protesting a university policy.
This view gains additional credence from the recent case of Pickering
v. Board of Education.6' This analogous case was based on the dismissal
160 U.S. National Student Association, In Loco Parentis, pp. I-1, 11-4 (Johnston 1962).
161 R. Perry, Realms of Value, Harv. Univ. Press, 411 (1954); See also, Joint Statement
of Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365, 367 (1967).
162 391 U.S. 563 (1968); The same day a nearly identical case arising in Alaska was re-
manded for "further consideration in light of Pickering.' See, Watts v. Seward School Board,
391 U.S. 592 (1968).
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of a public school teacher for publication of a letter-to-the-editor which, ac-
cording to the school board, was "detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district."'16 3 Pickering's claim of first
amendment protection was rejected by the board on the theory that his ac-
ceptance of a teaching position obliged him to possess a degree of loyalty
which would require him to refrain from criticizing the operation of the
district schools. The school board recognized that this was a differentiation
from the normal exercise of first amendment rights by non-teachers, but
raised the school district's interest as a superimposed duty on the teacher.
One can envision the analogous situation in which a university seeks to
sanction a student for a publication highly critical of the university admin-
istration or operation. One can paraphrase the school board's contention
in Pickering thusly: the student by virtue of his relationship with the uni-
versity has a duty of loyalty to his institution to protect its "good name"
and to further its educational goals.
This posited standard fails in three respects. First, it overlooks the
gravest danger of all which threatens a university's good name; that being,
the affront to academic freedom generally so highly esteemed in policy
declarations. By its attempt to exercise its power autocratically or in sup-
pression of freedom of expression, the ideal of academic freedom becomes
severely tarnished in the process. Second, the university has a sizeable ar-
senal with which to protect itself from any harm to its reputation which
might be caused by the words of a student. It too has the same forums
available to answer or refute the student's charges and it has the weight of
institutional influence on its side. Of course, the university like any other
institution may protect itself or obtain relief from the purported harm
through the usual channels for obtaining civil remedies. Third, whenever
a group of faculty members or alumni cry out that the university's good
name is being injured, another group of faculty members or alumni will
frequently cry out with equal volume that this same action by the student
is actually enhancing the school's reputation. In any event, where the crit-
icism is of a public function or public business, the interest of the university
in its private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest in dis-
semination of truth.1 4
Moreover, a university's reaction to a student's venture into the arena
of public debate which takes the posed tack would sharply contrast with the
basic concepts of free speech often enunciated by the Court.
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government [and presumably a university] may be responsive to
the will of the people [the students] . . .is a fundamental principle of
our constitutional system.165
103 Id.
304 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 esp at 72 (1964).
165 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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The utterances of students regarding the university are protected even
though erroneous or made out of hatred toward the university if the stand-
ards of Garrison v. Louisina'6" can, as they should, be said to apply.
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run
the risk that it will be proved in Court that he spoke out of hatred; even
if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to
the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.167
Pickering makes clear the constitutionally defective nature of regulatory
schemes imposed on teachers because of their status and relationship to a
school board. Surely, less cannot be said of the student who has, as only
one member of the student body, a more detached and short-term relation-
ship with the university. Finally it should be realized that while students
are not necessarily the best critics in matters of university administration,
they are in close contact with the actual operation of the institution and
therefore the public should not be deprived of their views."' 8
To deem permissible the sanctioning of students where the form or con-
tent of their off-campus, non-academic expressions violate school policy, is
to deny the concept that liberty of expression occupies a preferred place in
our scheme of values. The policy considerations which require that gov-
ernment abstain from interfering with expressional liberty is at least as ap-
plicable to universities.
The university can beyond doubt curtail or sanction publicly obscene
conduct. But this power relates to the previous discussion under the Due
rationale of imposing sanction only after a judicial finding of the fact of
obscenity, since obscenity is ipso facto non-protected169 and usually unlaw-
ful. Thus, a finding that a student has or is engaged in obscene conduct
may merit university sanction, subject of course, to the showing under other
relevant constitutional principles that its interest is sufficient to warrant its
action.
In the problem of our female student one final question must be raised:
Even though the rule proscribing "conduct unbecoming a lady" was known
to her, could she have known that her lawful conduct in posing for a mag-
azine photograph would subject her to university punishment? While it
might not be necessary to codify and closely define university rules respect-
ing academic honesty, it seems eminently reasonable to require rules, espec-
ially proscriptive rules, concerning non-academic and off-campus activities
to be fully articulated and well defined. The rules pertaining to academic
honesty, being such an integral part of the institutional makeup, can more
easily be taken as extant and understood by students taking advantage of
166 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
167 Id. at 73.
168 See, Pickering v. Board of Education, 36 Ill.2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (Schaefer,
J. dissenting).
169 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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the university's academic offerings. However, outside these purely aca-
demic rules, the requirements and proscriptions incumbent upon the student
cannot, with sufficient certainty, be said to be known by students. This
problem has not gone unnoticed as a very real dilemma facing students.
The American Civil Liberties Union has recognized this problem and has
offered a resolution which in pertinent part reads:
Regulations governing the behavior of students should be fully and dear-
ly formulated, published and made available to the whole academic com-
munity. They should be reasonable and realistic. Overelaborate rules
that seek to govern student conduct in every detail tend either to be re-
spected in the breach, or to hinder the development of mature attitudes.
... [S]pecific definitions are preferable to such general criteria as 'conduct
unbecoming to a student' or 'against the best interests of the institution,'
which allow for a wide latitude of interpretation.170
The vague declaration about unladylike conduct not only fails in a de-
sirable policy sense to give the student adequate notice of the potentially
sanctionable nature of her being photographed, but it falls short of the con-
stitutional requirement that regulations penal in nature dearly delineate
the outer limits of permissible conduct. To paraphrase Professor Freund,
it should be improper, in light of today's constitutional jurisprudence re-
garding expressional freedoms, to permit a university regulation admittedly
vague at the time of the student's action to be cured by a subsequent con-
struction defining the act as immoral or unladylike.'7 1
By asserting that the university's regulation is too imprecise to provide
adequate warning that her actions were potentially subject to sanction, the
student should not be viewed as engaging a useful defensive ploy to escape
punishment. The unacceptable nature of vague proscriptive regulations
has long been intimately associated with the substance of individual free-
dom. This is especially true in first amendment cases where the standard
of definiteness for regulations curtailing free expression is stricter than it is
for other types of restrictions. This more rigid standard was restated and
emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,' where the Court made pat-
ently clear that "... . [B]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity ... [thus making the] standards of permissible . . . vagueness
strict in the area of expression."'' 73
The vague terms condemned by the ACLU resolution, cited above,:14
and forming the basis of the university's purported action, would seem to
'-
7 0 American Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in
Colleges and Universities (1961).
171p. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L REV. 533, 540-541 (1951).
172 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
173 Id. at 603 citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 438 (1963). See also, cases cited
note 61 supra.
174 Supra note 170.
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doubtless fall within the penumbra of the first amendment vagueness doc-
trine. The proscription against "conduct unbecoming a lady" can only be
viewed as wholly lacking in "terms susceptible of measurement . . . and
having the quality of extraordinary ambiguity."'' 5
Even assuming, arguendo, that the student's conduct in posing for the
photograph does not come within the classification of protected expression,
the proscription should nonetheless be viewed as impermissible within the
vagueness doctrine.1  Thus considered, the regulation becomes one aimed
at conduct which is not constitutionally protected and, perhaps, not even
socially desirable. Irrespective of the classification into which the activity
is thus placed, the regulation, while not vague on its face and therefore not
void on its face, becomes subject to the vagueness doctrine in light of the
manner in which it is applied. "Men, [and supposedly students) of com-
mon intelligence [still] must necessarily guess at its meaning."'177
Permissible University Abridgment of Otherwise Protected First
Amendment Exercises
Finally and briefly, we should consider the possibility that there may
exist times and circumstances which would operate to limit or even suspend
the constitutionally underscored rights of students discussed above. While
there is no case law or other authority on this point, perhaps a viable anal-
ogy can be made to the recent turmoil we have experienced in American
cities.
American universities in recent years have experienced student-inspired
and student-led disruptions and upheavals not unlike those occurring in our
cities. What then is the power of the university in these disturbances vis-a-
vis the students' rights of expression and action ?178 Throughout this thesis
it has been granted that the university may, in certain instances, impose
reasonable regulations comporting with its academic purposes as to the
time, place, and manner of student engagement in constitutionally pro-
tected activity. Given this grant, it is not illogical to assume that in a situ-
ation of riot or other great disturbance on the campus, the university may
possess the powers similar to a mayor or governor in declaring a "state of
175 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,286 (1961).
176 Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 26; see also, Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252
(1965), dismission cert. granted 379 U.S. 998 (1964) as improvidently granted (Douglas, J.
dissenting), "If a penal statute is so impredse [i.e.: vagrancy] as to deny fair warning to those
who might transgress it, any conduct.., under it which might have been proscribed by a more
precisely worded statute is irrelevant," at 253; United States v. National Dairy, 372 U.S. 29
(1963) (Black, J. dissenting); Contra, Dominguez v. City of Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961).
'77 Id.
178 In discussion the posed contingency reference is made only to those campus activities
such as student organizations, student publications, on-campus residence halls, etc. which are
not otherwise controlled or regulated by state or local laws. Nor does this discussion refer to
police matters since it is presumed that whatever law enforcement agency is or may be callled in
is under the control of someone or some agency other than the university.
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campus emergency." Within a community the declaration of a state of
emergency by the chief administrative official generally allows for the im-
position of certain restrictions on normally legal activities.17 Thus con-
sidered, it would be a wise legislative action to recognize the campus as a
potential place of disturbance and specifically delegate and authorize the
proper university officials to act to protect university property and to achieve
a return to normalcy as quickly as possible. Likewise, it would be a wise
university administration that sought to promulgate a particular set of reg-
ulations to become operative upon the happening of the contingency.
By allowing the university to recognize and declare a state of campus
emergency similar to that recognized within other communities, civil dis-
order situations within the campus borders could be dealt with fairly and
quickly. Hopefully, the judicious use of these powers would permit the
university to avoid the inflamatory publicity and undesirable political rami-
fications as well as the closing off of non-violent options that so frequently
attend a civil disorder.
In weighing the student activities of ffieetings, assemblies, demonstra-
tions, and the like against the supposed precarious situation, it is not un-
likely that the constitutionally established clear and present danger test
applied to campus activities through Hammond might well be met. In
such an instance, the normally applied devices of curfew and restricted as-
sembly, etc., do not seem too severe an infringement on otherwise pro-
tected activity.
The obvious advantage of recognizing this broad power within the uni-
versity is that it allows for a flexible response, at the "local" level, to an
emergency situation. The application of the power can be tailored to deal
with the individual characteristics of the situation. Emergency regulations
can be applied only to the degree necessary and only in the area of the cam-
pus involved in the disorder. Life on the remainder of the campus can be
allowed to proceed as normally as possible. Through this option of swift
and flexible action to a potentially turbulent situation, a level of control
may be effected before the disorder becomes a destructive force.
This idea is not without its corollary disadvantages. In exercising these
posed powers, the university must be certain that it is acting on a firm legal
basis, because some of the regulations imposed, or even the power to im-
pose them, may be tested in court. A judicial decision against the univer-
sity's right to use these summary powers, or against some of the regulations
promulgated in applying them, may cause a serious dislocation in the future
institutional planning program regarding civil disorders. Invalidation of
some acts done under summary powers in one incident may hinder effective
application of other, perfectly permissible regulations in subsequent nci-
179 Se e.g., Wisconsin Stat. 66.235 which allows for suspension of normally lawful activity
in time of turmoil as declared by the city council arising inter alia from "riot or civil com-
motion." The city authorities are empowered "to order whatever is necessary or expedient."
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dents because respect for the university's exercise of authority may be com-
promised by adverse court decisions.
Another potential disadvantage of the posed summary powers is that
their invocation may limit the use of other less publicized or informal
means to control the situation. The use of these powers may aggravate the
already potentially serious status by telling both sides that the point has
now been reached where violence from one side is expected and extraordi-
nary measures will be used by the other to suppress it.
In the final analysis, it is difficult at best to attempt to subsume a uni-
versity's nature within that category of characteristics nomally assigned to
a city. The function of the university does not lend itself to provision for
massive law enforcement or control of civil disorders. This is, and rightly
so I think, normally thought of as a task of the state agencies who usually
are concerned with such matters. However, it is not illogical to propose
that in those areas of student activity common only to the campus, the uni-
versity should be able to exercise a degree of emergency control differing
only in nature from a city.180
CONCLUSION
If the foregoing has any persuasive value at all, it should be to lay at
rest any remnant of the once dominant idea that universities, like medieval
'corporations, are entities outside of the ordinary law. While it is undis-
puted that the nature of a university campus, with its tightly packed and
constantly interacting population, makes necessary some degree of institu-
tional rule-making authority, observation should show that such rule-mak-
ing authority differs only in degree and kind peculiar to the nature of the
university community vis-a-vis the "typical" community. The traditional
view that the university, for one reason or another, may or must act to con-
trol the student in his everyday life affairs, his published expressions, the
organizations he forms and joins, the views he expresses in public places,
or causes to be expressed by the speakers he invites, and his propensities
for general law violation must expire under examination. It is hard to
reconcile the prevalence of the vivid fears inherent in the traditional view
with the primary functions of the university in preparing tomorrow's citi-
zens for their role in community life through the transmission and increase
of knowledge. It is even more difficult to reconcile acceptance of all-per-
vasive university regulation of students as a way of life on the campus with
the recognition that no other community or institutional body may so act
in relation to the rest of the populace and remain consonant with consti-
tutional mandates.
180 See generally, Suppression of Civil Disorder in Pre-Riot, Trans-Riot, and Civil Disturb.
ance Situations, National League of Cities, Nov. 10, 1967; Report of the National Advisory
Commission op Civil Disorders, N.Y. Times ed. 1968 esp. at 522-528.
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